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BEYOND CONTESTED ELECTIONS:THE PROCESSES OF BILL CREATION 
AND THE FULFILLMENT OF DEMOCRACY'S PROMISES 
Ann Seidman1 , Robert B . Seidman2 and Bradley Holt3 
-ooo-
"There is hardly any kind of intellectual work which so much needs done, 
not only by experienced and exercised minds, but by minds trained to the 
task through long and laborious study, as the business of making laws." 
- - John Stuart Mill 4 
Long before 1996, earlier promises of 'development ' had 
splintered into a million shards . Development -- defined as the 
use of state power to bring about social, political, and economic 
change in favor of the mass of the population almost 
everywhere had seemingly imploded. 5 Babies in the poorer 
countries could expect to live from ten to thirty years fewer 
than those born in industrialized countries. 6 By the late 1980s, 
1 Boston University School of Law and Clark University. 
2 Boston University School of Law. 
3 
4 Quoted in Ernst Freund, "The Problem of Intelligent Lehgislation", xx 
PROC. AM. POL. Ser. Assoc . 69, 70 (19xx) 
5 ANN SEIDMAN AND ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, STATE AND LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: PROBLEM-
SOLVING AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD ( 19 94) Ch . 1 . 
6 Life expectancy, reflecting as it does a number of quality of life 
factors (for example, nutrition, health care, housing, and the duraton and 
quality if labour) serves as a useful measure of quality of life. WORLD BANK, QilJ;:IB 
- - LONG TERM DEYELOPMENT I SSUES AND OPTIONS ; A WORLD BANK COUNTRY ECONOMIC REPORT ( 19 8 5) . In 
the OECD , life expectancy in 1991 was about 75 years ; in subs-Saharan Africa, 
about 5 2 years . WORLD BANK' WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 19 91 : THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT 
(1991) . 
the average African's real income had slipped 20 to 25 per cent 
from its level at Independence, twenty-odd years earlier. 7 War, 
ethnic cleaning and anarchy added grim increments of horror . 8 
Very few countries' inhabitants experienced an improved 
quality of life. From time to time a few countries' rates of 
growth seemingly rocketed upwards, only to fizzle: Argentina in the 
1950s, Kenya and Ivory Coast in the 1960s, Brazil and South Africa 
in the 1970s. In the 1970s and '80s, Asia's 'little dragons' GNPs 
also soared. 9 Mostly, however, 'development' remained not even a 
grim jest. That reality obtained without discrimination; it 
affected as well highly authoritarian as 'democratic' states. 
Commonly, commentators ascribed these dismal results to 
leaders' personal failures, or to legislators' venality . 10 A 
contrary view holds that more than individual disasters, 
institutions blocked the changes that development required. 11 This 
7 In 1989, OECD income averaged about $19,000 per capita; in Africa and 
Southern Asia, l ess than $1000. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1989. 
B 
9 They benefitted from exceptional circumstances unlikely to benefit most 
third world countries; Seidman & Seidman, n . , Ch.2. 
10 FRANZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH ( 19 6 3) . 
11 See generally, ANN SEIDMAN AND ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, STATE AND LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS: PROBLEM- SOLVING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE THIRD WORLD ( 19 94) . Leadership 
venality and institutional failures do not exhaust the explanations for the failures 
of development. Among a certain segment of scholars concerned with issues of law and 
development, an alternative proposition has a certain current cachet: The 
explanation for the failure of polities to enact development oriented laws that in 
article focusses on a central set of those institutions, those that 
create the laws . 12 Part I preliminarily discusses this article's 
foundation proposition: That in the development effort, third 
world countries mainly failed approporiately to use government's 
principal tool in directing social change: the legal order. 
Adopting a problem-solving methodology, 13 Part II specifies 
whose and what behaviors constitute the social problem addressed --
fact induce development lies in their fallacius assumoptions that laws can change 
society . That proposition, after all, flies counter to an important strain of 
jurisprudence. The historical school , see XXX VON JEHRING xx, sociological 
jurisprudence, see PAUL EHRLICH, xx , RoscoE POUND, xx, Marxist jurisprudence, see KARL 
MARX AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS, xx and anthropological jurisprudence, see LAURA NADER. xx , in 
essence all taight that law reflects society. How can a mere reflection in effect 
create the object reflected? That led to the assertion that the entire enterprise 
of using state power has no more chance of success in attaining people-centered 
development than the search for El Dorado. [See recent review of the Law and 
Development literature in Am J. Int'l Law J.; and cite other articles (e .g. Ghai, 
Kidder, etc.] Academic doomsayers notwithstanding, most countries in the third 
world continued to work on using state power to develop; the World Bank, USAID, UNDP 
the Asian Development Bank and many private agencies continued to behave as though 
they believed that the law did have an effect on development, and in many cases, 
backed their bets with substantial funding . This paper need not take a position on 
that issue (but see Robert B. Seidman, "Law and Poverty" in M. L. 
MARAsINGHE AND WILLIAM CONKLIN (EDS.) ESSAYS ON THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVES IN JURISPRUDENCE (1984); 
Seidman & Seidman, supra n. xx, at 119). It does argue, however, that (i) states 
have no other means of inflencing change , see n. xx; and (ii) so long as states 
continue to try to use law to bring about social, political and economic change, 
the social practices concerned with law-making remain a valid arena 
for study. 
12 Thius paper leaves to another day the examination of solutions for the 
legislature's usual subservience to the executive, and its general incapacity for 
legislative leadership -- for example, its lack of drafting capacity , see below, 
t ext at n. xx, the insufficiency of its committee structure, or the inability of 
many elected members to assess legi slative materials. See, e.g., xx. 
13 On the problem-solving methodology as the preferred methodology for 
legislation, see Robert B. Seidman, "Justifying Legislation: A Pragmatic, 
Institutionalist Approach to the Memorandum of Law, Legislative Theory and Practical 
Reason" , 29 HARv. J. LEG. 1 (1992) ; Seidman and Seidman, supra n . xx , Ch. 4; Gouvin, 
supra n. xx; but see Rubin, supra n. xx, at xx (drafters should first determine the 
legislation's ends; the bill becomes its means); and see n. [beginning with •van 
Benda-Bechmann] below. 
here, the failure of elected legislatures to enact laws that 
advance the interests of the majority that elected them . It 
demonstrates that in most countries, despite democracy's 
constitutional premise, deficiencies in legislative output 
reflected weaknesses not only in the legislative but also in the 
e x ecutive branch. 1 4 In contrast to the mythical world of 
constitutional lawyers, in the real world the executiv e branch 
exercised monopoly power over legislation. Not the sound and fury 
of an elected parliament, but, de facto, the administrations' 
silent , secretive bill-creating processes became the critical site 
of law-making. 1 5 In most polities, not the elected members of the 
polity's "most powerful collective decision-maker", but many 
appointed and and a few elected officials in the executive branch 
became the key actors: the ministerial civil servants who dev eloped 
the legislative programs; the ministerial and central drafting 
office lawyers who actually embodied those legislative programs in 
1 4 In thi s a rti c l e we u se ' b ill -cr eating ' to mean t he proce sses by whi ch an 
i dea becomes a b ill p r esent ed t o t h e l egi s l a ture; 'la w-enacting ' , t h e leg i s l at i ve 
p r ocess prop er , a nd ' l aw -ma king ' t o mean both combined and, i n some sys t ems , 
approva l by t h e executive. In the Ang l o -American t raditio n , the t e rm ' bill -
dra f ti n g ' h as come t o s ignify only the p rocesses by whi c h draf ters , a l mos t 
exc l usively lawyer s , put oth e r p eopl es ' ideas i n to 'legal' f o rm, t h a t i s , a part of 
what we s u bsume u n der ' b ill- creating ' . See be l ow , text at n . xx). 
1 5 
f 
statutory language; 1 6 and the ministers who at least in 
constitutional theory supervised their work. 17 Those officials time 
and again failed to produce any development-related bills. When 
enacted into law, the few bills they wrote that might conceivably 
relate to developement too often failed to induce the behaviors 
they prescribed, or privileged elite, not mass interests. 
Problem- solving' s arguably most importarrt step1 8 requires 
elucidating the causes of existing problematic behaviors. Part III 
accordingly offers two sets of explanations for the problematic 
behaviors of the relevant executive branch officials. First, it 
explains the failure of laws' frequent failure to induce the 
prescribed behaviors, mainly by the inadequate research on which 
the drafters grounded their bills, reflecting not only their own 
limits, but those of the drafting institutions within which they 
16 I n thi s p a p e r , we d e note these two set s o f o ffi c i a l s collective l y as 
' dra f te r s ' . 
17 Tha t these func t ion s frequently overl apped, s e e be l ow text at n. xx. 
18 A bill provides a solution for an existential social 
problem. Unless it addresses that problem's causes, at best it can 
merely poultice symptoms. The serarch for explanations -- causes 
-- constitutes a key step in problem-solving, for without it, small 
chance exists of basing legislation on reason informed by 
experience . Sede Seidman and Seidman, supra n . xx, at 76 ff . What 
some authora denote as 'problem-solving' omits this key step, see 
House, etc . ; Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Order 
Beyond International Relations Theory," in ROBERT 0. KE OPHANE, (ED .), 
NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS (1986) I and converts them either int o ends-
means or incrementalist methodologies. See below , text at n . xx . 
worked. Second, it explains the prevalent elite biases of the 
bills generated mainly in terms of the structural biases of those 
institutions' input, feedback and conversion processes. 
As its third step, problem-solving calls for generating 
proposals for solution designed to alter or eliminate the causes of 
responsible actors' problematic behaviors. Part IV proposes 
various ways of restructuring the existing institutionalized bill-
creating processes. 19 
I. 
LOCATING THE DIFFICULTY: THIRD WORLD GOVERNMENTS' FAILURE TO 
USE LAW IN AID OF DEVELOPMENT 
As a foundation for the later discussion of bill-creating 
institutions, this Part discusses (1) the legal order's function in 
the development process; (2) the law-makers' general f a ilure to 
employ the legal order as an instrument of development; and (3) 
the limits of the contestation-centered definition of 'democracy ' 
and its focus not on bill - crating, but on law-enactment. 
A. LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS. 
Even if only to ensure appropriate conditions for optimal 
19 The fourth and f inal step of probl em-sol ving consists o f implementation and 
monitoring t he effect iveness of the proposed solution -- a step beyond the reach o f 
this paper. 
market functions, 20 development requires the use of state power. 
Typically, government leaders' declared that they would eradicate 
perceived social, political or economic difficulties . These 
difficulties invariably constituted social problems i.e. I 
problematic repetitive patterns of behaviors21 (or institutions22 ) • 
20 See [Big Bang article]; xx Shibata, ... . 
21 Cf. HARRY M.JOHNSON , SOCIOLOGY : A SYATEMATIC INTRODUCTION (1960) 639; Harry v. 
Bal l, George Eaton Simpson and Kiyoshi Ikedqa , "Law and Soc i al Change: Sumner 
Reconsidered, " 67 AM. J . Soc. 532 (196 7 ) . For example, the perceived di ff i culty of 
polluted underground wat er consti tutes a soci al probl em , in that i t resu l ts from the 
repetit i ve behaviors of defined sets of peopl e : Far mers whose agri cul tura l 
fert i lizers runoff i nto under ground water courses , or i ndust r i al managers whose 
f actories do t he same with equally poi sonous wastes. 
22 GEORGE CASPER HOMANS , THE NATURE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE ( 1 96 7 ) ; Norman Uphof f ' xx . This 
definition is contest ed. Cf. Sven-Erik Sjostrand, "On Ins t itut i onal Thought in the 
Socia l and Economi c Sci ences" I in I NSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (SVEN- ERIK SJOSTRAND , ED. ' 1993)' 
9 ('institution' means 'a human mental construct for a coherent 
system of shared (enforced) norms that regulate individual 
interactions in recurrent situations"; 'institutionalization' means 
"the process by which individuals intersubjectively approve , 
internalize and externalize such a mental construct"); Douglass C. 
North, supra n. xx ('institution' consists of 'formal rules , 
informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions a nd self-
imposed codes of conduct) and the enforcement characteri stics of 
both. 11 North distinguishes institutions from 'organization 1 : 
"groups of individuals engaged in purposive activity. The 
constraints imposed by the institutional framework (together with 
other constraints) define the opportunity set and therefore the 
kind of organizations that will come into ex istence ... . The agent of 
change is the entrepreneur, the decision - maker(s) in 
organizations . 11 At xx . ) ; HARRY M. J OHNSON , SOC I OLOGY: A SYSTEMATIC 
I NTRODUCTION (1960) 22 ('social institution' means a "complex 
normative pattern that is widely accepted as binding in a 
particular society or part of society .") The behav ioral d e finition 
seems more useful for analyzing the law-making enterprise : Law 
alway s addresses behaviors; law can only transform institutions by 
changing behaviors. Problem-solving holds that the key question 
becomes, why do those behavioural patterns ex ist? See supra , n. xx . 
A drafter ought to count as important not merely the clarity and 
Underdevelopment reflects the interactions of a whole forest of 
sometimes conflicting institutions that, together, grind out 
poverty and oppression. 23 
Policies alone, however, rarely change institutions; that task 
cnstitutes a law-job. 24 • At most, policies usually change only the 
climate of discourse. Until enacted into a law that ensures that 
behaviors change in a way likely to effectuate the policy, it 
amounts to no more than statement of intentions. 
elegance of a bill's words, but its likely effectiveness in 
bringing about its prescribed behaviors, and their probable 
effectieness in resolving the social problem at which the law aims. 
To serve a drafter's needs, the definition of 'institutions' ought 
to reflect that requirement -- not merely to change the rules, but 
to change behaviors . Those utilitarian considerat i ons suggest two reasons for 
the definition of 'institution ' used here: (i) Because solutions build on causes (or 
explanations), to build into the definition of 'institution' onl y one possible 
explanation for repetitive patterns of behavior (for example, that the normative 
pattern is 'widely accepted as binding', Johnson, op. cit. this note) tends to limit 
the investigation of explanations for those repetitive patterns, and thus contracts 
the range of possible legislative initiatives to change them. (ii) To confine the 
def inition of 'institution' t o the rules that prescribe the behavior (as does North, 
loc . cit . ) can lead only to focussing on the rules as distingised from the behavior 
they will likely induce in the given circumstances; that is, it neglects the 
American Legal Realists' observation that the law-in-act i on systematically differs 
from the lw-in-the-books, see Karl Llewellyn, "Some Realism about Rea lism" .. .. 
That ignores the potential use of law to change institutions and thus to foster 
development . See below, text at n. xx. 
23 Seidman and Seidman, supra n. 10; see ... [NIE writings on development and 
institutions ; see especially Joel Trachtman on law and economics and law and 
development]; Antoni Z. Kaminski and Piotr Stralkowski, "Strategies of Institutional 
Change in Central and Eastern European Economies", in Sjostrand, ed . , supra n. xx, 
at 13 9; JAMES G. MARCH AND JOHAN P. OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS 
OF POLITICS (1989) ; Douglass North, "Institutional Change: A Framework of lrnalysis ", 
in Sjostrund, supra this note, 
the institutional constraints 
activity that do not encourage 
at 35, 44 ("Third world countri es are poor because 
define a set of pay-offs to political/economic 
productive activity.") 
24 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION??? 
Development-related policies usually proclaim desired changes 
in resource allocations. For example, inflation appear s to the 
economist as too many dollars chasing too few goods. How to stop 
those insubordinate dollars from their inflationary pursuits? 
Government has no tool that can accomplish that directly. Its 
principle tool for social control is the law. 25 Law, however, 
cannot command those dollars to cease and desist, or those 
recalcitrant goods to multiply. It can only address behaviors. To 
draft a bill likely to overcome that social problem, a drafter must 
analyze the apparent social problem into its constituent actors and 
their behaviors: Those in the Central Bank who issue money; those 
in commercial banks who make loans; employers who pay higher or 
lower wages; and all the other actors who to one extent or another 
influence the money supply; 26 or, on the supply side, the behaviors 
of those concerned with the production and distribution of goods 
and services : Raw materials suppliers, transporters, manufacturers, 
energy suppliers, wholesalers and retailers. Only then can the 
drafter devise a legislative program likely to alter the factors 
that cause those behaviors. 
Gov ernment's employment of the law as its instrument of 
25 [Douglas Black on the sociology of law] 
26 ZHAO HoNGCHENG REFORM OF THE FINANCI AL SYSTEM AND I NFLAT ION IN C HINA (unpubli s h ed MS ' 
1 990) 
social change does not arise out of government's perverse fix ation 
on law. Despite its limits, besides the legal order , broadly 
conceiv ed, 27 what other instruments does government hav e to carry 
out policy ?28 Until a policy becomes effectively implemented law, 
the institutions that shape the difficulties at which the policy 
aims of course constantly change, but in way s determine d b y the 
interacting, often conflicting behaviors of a mob of actors, not by 
gov ernment . The legal order comprises gov ernments' primary tool 
for alteri ng the whole system of interrelated institutions that 
perpetuate their underdevelopment and poverty . 29 
A country 's inability to achieve sustainable dev elopment 
reflects the failure of its government, no matter how 'democratic' , 
to use its legal order to transform relevant social, political and 
economic institutions. As an underlying premise, the western 
27 
' Legal order ' here means more tha n the wr i tten words of the laws . It 
includes not only the text s of l aws , regul a t ions a nd oth er norms promu l gated by the 
state, but also the l aw- mak ing and l aw-imp l ementing inst itutions -- i .e., the entire 
normative system i n which the s t ate has a f inger. See Seidman and Seidman , supra n. 
xx, at 4 1. 
2B As one al t ernative, Ch airman Mao argued that if everyone had the correct 
ideology, everyone would know what to do. [Cite?xx] That directed government to use 
not law b u t ideology as an instrumen t of soc i a l c h ange . Mao t ried that in the 
Cu l tura l Revolut i on, wi th resu l ts that hardl y recommend it as a model for social 
change. 
29 Sei dman a nd Sei dman, supra n . xx , at xx. That does not deny that , albeit 
without f ormal authority or sanction s , non- government al actors change institutions: 
'Entrepreneurs', see North , supra n . xx, NGOs, seexx; army coups; and others. 
Governmen t , however , operates pri marily thr ough t h e legal order . For it, l aw 
becomes ine l uctabl y the t ool of choice. 
concept of democracy seemingly implies that elected officials, 
using state power, would seek to enhance the majority's quality of 
life -- else, why bother? On their laws' successes rested the very 
essence of a democratic 'development'. By and large, in this most 
third world government badly tripped. 
A. GOVERNMENT'S FAILURES TO USE LAW FOR DEVELOPMENT. 
Whether or not fairly denoted 'democratic', many, probably 
most, polities' laws looking to change institutions to foster 
development (however defined) did not work as intended. 30 
30 See Neva Seidman Makgetla and Robert B. Seidman, "Legal Draft i ng and the 
Defeat of Development Policy: The Experience of Anglophonic Southern Africa", 5 J. 
LAW AND RELIGION 421 (1987) . Or consider land reform initiatives in Latin America: The 
land reform law adopted in Venezuela --a country that after 1958 had eight honest 
and highly competitive elections -- benefitted only a few communities; critics 
claimed its greatest achievement lay in giving enough peasants just enough land to 
forestall widespread support for the local guerrilla movement .DANIEL C. HELLINGER, 
VENEZUELA, TARNISHED DEMOCRACY (1991) 104-07. In Chile in 1967' democratically- elected 
President Frei promised that land reform would "change the lives of 1, 000, 000 
peasants," but, by the end of his term, only 20,000 peasants had received land. 
Chile: Agrarian reform at last, Latin Am. Newsletters, July 28, 1967 at 108; see 
also LOIS HECHT OPPENHEIM, POLITICS IN CHILE (1993) 24 (outlining earlier failed efforts 
at land reform in Chile) . In Colombia, the elected government's land reform 
installed only 290,000 families on only 1% of the arable land, while the richest 
four percent of all landholders still occupied sixty-seven percent. ??? [Brad 
cites Colombian Authorities have introduce Draft Agrarian Legislation, ANDEAN GROUP 
REGIONAL REPORT, Oct. 5,; but, since the legislation was apparently introduced in 
1984, that cannot be right.] 
i 
Unimplemented, 31 many laws remained merely symboliC2, or merely 
denounced unwanted behavior on pain of criminal penalties. 33 As 
a result, some academics wrote learned papers in unread law reviews 
about overcriminalization; 34 others wrote equally learned and 
equally unread papers about how law cannot change society; 35 and, 
world-wide, ordinary people voiced a familiar lament: "We have good 
31 In the former French col onies, following French tradition, typically the 
e lected legislatures enacted laws that, until implemented by an executive decree, 
remained purely symbolic. E.g., the Lao P.D.R. enacted the Law on Foreign Invest ment 
in 19xx, but has thus far failed to enact an implementing decree; the law remains 
a dead letter. The same obtained in Vietnam; [I t is said that in Vietnam, the 
legislature typically enacts a law that is so vague and general that it says 
nothing; thus has democracy abdicated. CHECK!!!. At date of writing, Indonesia had 
enacted a xx law and an xx law, but has not enacted any implementing decree for 
either . 
32 Not only third world governments enacted laws that at most remained 
symbolic. See, e.g., Eric J. Gauvin , "Truth in Savings and the Failure of 
Legislative Methodology", 62 UNIV. OF CINCINNATI L. REV . 1281 (1994); Edward Rubin, 
"Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth- in-Lending Act," 80 GEORGETOWN 
L. J. 233, 240 (1991); and see generally, MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF 
POLITICS (1964) (unimplemented law frequently arises because the legislature enacted 
the law precisely for its symbolic, not instrumental uses . ) 
33 See text below, at n. xx. 
34 See, e.g., 
35 Robert L. Kidder, Connecting Law and Society: An Introduction to Research 
and Theory (1983) xx (al l but impossible to know the impact of law on behavio r) ; 
John Griffiths , "Is Law Important?" 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 339 (1976) (law only carries 
out a political decision; that decision, not the law, counts as important) James M. 
Buchanan, "Politics, Property and Law: An Alternative Interpretation of Miller v. 
Schoene, " xx J. LAW AND ECONOMICS 439 (1972) (if law remains stable for a sufficient 
time, following the Coase theorem, parties will bargain their way around the law to 
reach the same allocations of goods and serviuces - - whatever the law in force); 
Lawrence Friedman, "Legal Culture and Social Development," 4 LAW AND SOCIETY REv. 29 
(1969) ( ' values and attitudes' determine what laws and institutions work, and whi ch 
do not); J.P. Roche and M. M. Gordon, " Can Morality be Legislated?" NEwYoRKTIMES 
MAGAZINE, May 22, 1955) (values and attitudes as primary if not sole explanation for 
addressees ' fa i lures to obey the law.); Brian Z, xx. [review article in Am. J. Int ' l 
L., 1995] 
r 
laws but they remain badly implemented." 
Perhaps most frequently, most states's legislatures did not 
consider, let alone enact, many laws that purported to aim at mass-
directed development. They seldom defeated development either by 
enacting anti-developmental laws, or refusing to enact development-
oriented laws. For the most part, they simply ma de 'non-
decisions' ; 36 save very rarely, transformatory laws did not come 
before them for a vote . 
Consider a recent case , post-apartheid South Africa . More or 
less democratic elections marked the end of the apartheid era, 
giving the liberation movement led by the African National Congress 
the Presidency and clear majorities in both houses of the National 
Assembly . Before that land-slide vote, apartheid laws structured 
all South African societal institutions, ensuring that e thnicity 
determined not only social groupings but also economic class. At 
the time of writing, three y ears later, most of these laws 
remained. The South African legislature had considered only a 
thimbleful of bills that arguably aimed even marginally to 
transform the inherited institutions. 37 The Ministry of Land Policy 
36 Pete r Bachrach a n d Morton S. Baratz , "Decision s a n d Non- Dec i sions: An 
Ana l yt i cal Framework" , 5 7 AM . PoL. Ser . REV . 632 (1 963) 
37 The La nd Resti t ution La w a imed t o r es t o r e l a n d titl e t o those wh o he l d i t 
p rio r to removal by aparthe i d measures; but most o f those removed h ad n ot previ ously 
he l d tit le in a way r ecogniz e d by the n a tioa l l ega l sys t e m, a n d h e n ce cou l d not 
had begun preparation of some transformatory bills. 38 Most of the 
other ministries, however, seemngly did not even perceive the 
imperative for transformatory legislation. 39 South Africa's 
mirrored the situation in most countries: No matter how 
democratically elected, everywhere legislatures not only failed to 
enact many laws looking to institutional transformation; they did 
claim under the new bill . [CHECK!!!] A labor bill proposed changes in i ndustrial 
relations institutions; and regulations with respect of housing also tended towards 
institutional change . A Police Act significantly changed decision-making about 
police pol icy . The Land Tenure (Agrickutural Labourers) Act [CHECK NAME OF ACT!!! ] 
made it difficult to evict some sharecropping tenants, but did not change the 
basically feudal relationships embodied in those tenures. See xxx. 
38 The Land Ministry's initia l "Land Policy: Framework Document Paper" stated 
in no uncertain terms the need for ' fundamental change' to 'improve the 
opportunities of all South Afri cans to access land for beneficial and productive 
use.' Community demands from the bottom, not government initiatives from the top, 
would drive that change; it would rest on participation and accountability. The 
'priority . .. is to address the needs of the poor ', and especial l y those o f women. 
It recognized the connections between land polic i es and agriculture, nature 
conservation, water supply, forestry and mining. It proposed eight maj or goals: (1 ) 
The restitution of l and to persons deprived of it by past racial policies; (2) the 
redistribution of land to benef it the disadvantaged and the poor; (3) security of 
tenure for all South Afr i cans under diverse forms o f tenure ; (4) the 
rationalization, simp l ification and decentralization of the day to day land 
administration systems; (5) the development of a cadastral system for land registry; 
(6) the transformation of the system for managing state land; (7) f ac ilitating an 
improved land development mechani sm; and (8) improving the skills and enhancing the 
capacity o f participants in the land r e form programme. See Department of Land 
Affairs, "Land Policy Framework Document" Draft: May 11, 1995 . As of the date of 
writing, however, onl y re l ative l y minor elements of the first and thi rd o f these had 
been reduced to bi lls.xx 
39 RDP White Paper ; [CITE!!!] (the Reconstriction and Development Program 
office asked each ministry t o write its proposals for carrying out reconstructo and 
develoment in its sphere of interest; under the heading of 'proposed legislation' 
most ministries answered 'none ', and most of the l egislation actually proposed 
seemed trivial.) In one provi ncial Arts and Cultural Ministry, f or examp l e , when 
asked to implement the RDP, the civil servants claimed they a l ready did so by 
issuing booklets and radio programs directed to women on subjects such as How to Set 
the Table , Formal and Informal Dining, How to Make Ironing Enj oyable, Embroidery, 
etc . (Authors ' interview with a Mini stry consultant, August, 1995). 
@I 
not even consider them . 40 That failure raised questions about the 
utility of the contestation-centered definition of 'democracy' 
C. THE CONTESTATION-CENTERED DEFINITION OF 1 DEMOCRACY 1 
AND ITS IMPLIED FOCUS ON THE BILL-ENACTING PROCESSES . 
Legislators' widespread failure to pass the transformatory 
legislaton required for development occurred in the face of a 
world-wide trend towards towards competitive elections and 
therefore, according to many U . S . lawyers and political 
scientists, 41 towards 'democracy' . 42 Samuel Huntington, for example, 
characterized a political system as democratic "to the extent that 
its most powerful collective decision-makers are selected through 
fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freel y 
compete for votes, and in which virtually all the entire adult 
4° Four years [????] after Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, it was possible 
to write that it had enacted only a singl e , non-symbolic law that one might fairly 
denote as transformatory, creating a new set of prinary courts app l ying customar 
law. Since repealed , that law transferred local power from chiefs appointed by the 
old regime to a new magistracy appointed by the new regime. See R . B . Seidman, 
xxxxx. 
41 Other cultures uswe different definition; c.f. Fred Schaffer, "The r o le 
of Culture, Language , and Translation in the Study of Democracy: The Cas e of 
Senegal." Paper de livered at the Walter Rodney Seminar, African Studies Center, 
Boston University , Oct. 16, 1995. The difference has become a major area of 
contestation in international law, in which some of the sometime socialist stat e s 
of Asia assert a definition of 'democracy' that emphasizes not process but 
substantive outcomes in favor of the majority, see, e.g., xxx; and a minority view 
even in the United States, tha emhasized communitari an definit i ons, see xx. 
42 Samuel Huntington, 'Democracy's Third Wave', 2 J. of Democracy 12 (1993), 
reprinted in CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY REVISITED (Larry Diamond and Marc F . 
Plattner, eds.(; Baltimore: John Hopkins Univ. P ., 1993; cf. Thomas M. Franck , 
"The Emerging Right to Democratic Government", 86 Am.J.Int'l. L. 46, 47 (1992) 
( "Governments . . . that are legally committed to permitting open, mul t iparty, secret -
ballot elections with a universal franchise [are democratic] . ") 
population is eligible to vote. "4 3 
In recent years, in the Third World, in this sense country 
after country became 'democratic' Yesterday, in countries as 
different as Kenya, Zambia, South Africa, Nicaragua, Brazil and 
Panama, governors' power derived sometimes from a mere 'Ja' vote, 
sometimes from the vote of a minority electorate, sometimes from 
the barrel of a gun. Today, elected governments and legislatures 
hold power through processes certified by international 
organizations (not to speak of Jimmy Carter) as 'democratic. ' 44 
Huntington's notion of democracy constitutes a definition by 
stipulation. 45 His declaration that democracy means popular 
elections says nothing about the 'essence' of the concept of 
democracy. It cannot because, as in the case of words like 'truth' 
or 'God' or 'beauty,' the essence of democracy must lie in the eye 
of the beholder. Huntington's definition, however, has a function 
43 Huntington, supra n. xx [Democracy's Third Wave], at 44. 
44 In the very near past, this seeming t endency towards contested e l ections, 
greeted only a short time ago as proof positive that third world countri es were 
retuirning to the democratic fold, has begun to reverse it self. In Zimbabwe, 
President Mugabe was returned to o ff ice by a vote where no one stood aga inst him; 
Kenya seems to i ncline increasingly away from genuinely competit i ve elections; 
Algeria's mi l itary canceleed e l ections when it appeared that a Muslim 
fundamentalist party would likely win them, and excluded that party from competing 
in the next e l ection; in Nigeria , the military cancelled the results of an election 
that went against its candidate, and impri soned the winner. Se generally, Samue l 
Huntington, "xxxx". 
45 Some definitions define words by describing the re f erent. Others, like 
this one ' only st ipulate what the word means. OGD EN AND RICHARDS' THE MEANING OF MEANING. 
beyond mere clarification of meaning. It purports to separate the 
wheat of 'democratic' polities from the chaff of the undemocratic . 
By implication, it purports to identify which governments will 
likely act in favor of the people, and which will not. A 
definition that certifies as 'democratic' governments that do not 
act to benefit the majority that elected them, however, does not 
winnow out the wheat of people-centered polities. 46 
Yet as in many older Third World prototypes, so in these new 
democracies: The promise that popularly-elected governors would 
better the lot of the majority too often remained empty . To 
explain that seeming paradox, and conf ormably to the contestation-
centered definition of'democracy', at least since Bentley's seminal 
1908 work, 4 7 political scientists have focussed attention on the 
processes by which legislatures enact bills into law. 49 
Constitutional fiat granted elected representatives the legislative 
power; they must bear responsibility for the legislative output . 
To study why laws do or do not come into being, should not research 
start with the legislature? 49 
46 The test o f a descriptive definition lies in its accuracy. The test of 
a stipulative definition depends on its utility. Id. at xx. 
47 ARTHUR FISHER BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Odgard, ed . , 1908. 
49 See, e.g. xx; but see xxx and Dav id Browder [on the Clinton health bill; 
thatg apparently discusses the drafting process at length!!!!] 
49 
As a corollary to its principal claim concerning the 
importance for development of the law-making and especially the 
bill-creating processes, this article also contests the notion that 
competitive elections constitute the sine qua non of a democratic 
polity. In major part, the fatal obstacle to enacting laws likely 
to bring about institutional transformations in favour of the mass 
lay in major part in the bill-creating segment of law-making -- the 
portion of the law-making process furthest removed from the control 
of the elected representatives. By ignoring that reality, 
definitions that made elections democracy's touchstone seemed 
insufficient. 
The first Part provides evidence to locate the behaviors that 
in moist countries comprise the difficulty this article examines: 
the critical moment of the law-making process occurs, not when the 
legislature enacts a bill, but in the bill's voyaging across the 
seas they must sail to reach the legislature's shores. In those 
stormy, poorly charted seas jut up the rocks on which, too often, 
transformatory laws founder. 
II. 
THE DIFFICULTY: AN ANTI-DEMOCRATIC BILL-MAKING PROCESS 
The sub-text of Huntington's election-centered definition 
affirms the all but universal constitutional premise that a 
legislature constitutes the democratic polity's apex of power, its 
"most powerful collective decision-makers" 50 According to most 
constitutions, in an country laying claim to the appellation of 
'democratic', legislative power -- presumably the apex of power 
resides in the legislature. The elected legislature enacts the 
laws; appointed bureacrats have only the power given them by law. 51 
In principle, no member of the executive branch, elected or 
appointed, may lift an official finger without the justification of 
an enabling law duly enacted by the legislature. 5 2 Thus do elected 
representatives presumably control not only presidents and 
ministers and whole cabinets, but also improbably -- whole 
armies of appointed bureaucrats. 53 A reality check suggested 
a different picture. In very few polities did the legislature 
drive the legislative process. With few exceptions famously, 
50 Huntingdon, supra n. xx, at 44. Huntington's definition leaves vague 
whether by "the most powerful collective decision makers " he means the decision-
maker with the greatest power de jure or the greatest power de facto. After all, 
one might argue that democracy exists if by fair elections the majority of the 
electorate chose the l egislature, and then the legislature chose a triumvirate to 
rul e the country by decree for the term of office of the legislators. In t hat case, 
one might argue, Huntington's definition would characterize the country as 
'democratic': the triumvirate would count as the most powerful collective decision 
maker , selected "through" contested elections. No matter how fair the elections , 
would Huntington characterize as democratic a polity in which the electorate could 
choose its dictator every four years. Cf. Schumpeter, supra n. xx. 
51 Cite???? see any recent work on democracy 
52 Cf. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1949) xx (all laws fit into a 
hierarchy subsumed under the 'Grundnorm' - - roughly, the Constitution); see [any US 
case holding an administrative action unconstitutional because ultra vires] . 
53 Seidman and Seidman, supra n. xx, Ch. 9. 
r 
the United States54 not the legislature but the exe cutiv e 
e x ercised a de facto legislative monopoly over the bill-creating 
process, and hence over law-making . That capsized the notion of 
democratic government . First, this section examines the reality: 
That, in most countries, legislative power de facto lay , not in the 
parliamentary chambers, but behind the closed doors where anonymous 
e x ecutive - branch officials drafted the bills to which, all but 
invariably, Parliament voted its assent; and that those processes 
usually constituted a principal site for the e xercise of el i te and 
ruling class influence . Second, this section proposes some 
hypotheses to explain this shift in legislative power. Finally , it 
specifies whose and what behaviors shaped the third world bills 
that, when enacted into laws, so often proved inadequate to 
accomplish developmental goals in favor of the majority that , 
presumably , had elected the legislature. 
A. EXECUTIVE DOMINATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 5 5 
Notwi thstanding constitutional injunctions to the contrary , in 
54 The overwhe lming majority of the wor l d ' s poli t ica l scientists come from 
the United States. There, t he re l at i ve independence of the Congress gave at least 
a semblence of real ity to a model o f democracy that e l evated the legis l ature as the 
supreme power, and thus justified the contestation definition of ' demoracy '. It may 
well be that the contestation defini tion in fact amounts to no more than an 
extrapolation from the U.S. ' s c i rcumstances , demonstrat i ng yet again the dangers of 
assuming that the Thi r d (or any other) Worl d modeled itself on the United States. 
Cf. [any recent work on moderni zat i on theory] . 
55 See , in general, R. KENT WEANER AND BERT A . RocKMAN, EDS . , Do INSTITUTIONS MATTER? 
GOVERNMENT CAPABILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD (1992) 12 et seq . 
most if not all countries that met Huntington's definition of a 
democratic polity, the executive exercised a de facto monopoly in 
setting the legislative agenda, and in exercising legislative 
power . The tiny country of Belize, in Central America, exemplifies 
this difficulty. 56 Formerly the British Honduras, Belize received 
its independence from Great Britain in 1981 . It has a bicameral 
legislature, and well-institutionalized regular elections . It has 
freedom of speech and press and reasonably independent courts, and 
none of the patent horrors of the non-democratic state (for 
example, preventive detention by administrative fiat) . Three times 
since Independence in hotly-contested elections power has shifted 
between its two parties -- peacefully. Its Constitution plainly 
lodges legislative power in the Parliament. By any measure, it 
meets Huntington's definition of a democratic polity. 
Nevertheless, the Belize government still did not meet the 
poor' s basic needs. Neither government's nor civil society 's 
institutions hav e changed significantly. Belize City has become 
a city of tourist palaces57 and squalid huts . Elected gov ernments 
alternated between the nominal Left and Right (in what one Belize 
56 This sect i o n i s based o n info rmat i o n gat h ered i n the course of a recent 
con s ult a tio n in Be liz e . 
57 Be lize lies jus t l a ndwa rd o f on e o f t he wo rl d ' s g reates t coral r ee f s; i ts 
beaches are j ustly renowne d ; it s weathe r s a l ubrious; its anc i e nt Mayan r u i n s u niq ue . 
The hotel s that f ace the b each meet and exceed internatio n a l standards f or t ouri st 
l uxu ry . 
official dubbed 'my turn democracy'). None undertook a significant 
initiative to transform the country's institutions to favor of its 
poor majority . 
Belize's experience exemplified an almost world-wide 
condition. In many, likely most, gov ernments that Huntington's 
definition would classify 'democratic,' practice turned ov er 
legislative power, not to the elected legislature, but to the 
executive. 58 Parliament served at best as a forum for the 
opposition to voice objections. MPs slanged each other across the 
aisle . At the end of the day, however, Cabinet got what Cabinet 
wanted. 
That practice capsized the power relationships Huntington's 
definition presumed. That had two principal consequences, both 
making mince out of a democratic theory focussed exclu siv ely on 
electoral contestation: First, as in Belize, that practice made 
parliamentary law-making processes largely symbolic, and, 
therefore, Parliamentary elections almost59 equally symbolic . 
58 See , e . g . , Newel l M. Stul tz , " Parli aments in Former Bri t i sh Black Africa", 
2 J . DEVELOPING AREAS 479, 489 (1 968) (In Gh ana , Nigeria , Kenya , Uganda. Zambia and 
Tanzaia "parliaments .. . have been executive rubber stamps . No important piece of 
leg i s l ation h as been r e fu sed; indeed , much legi slat i on has been enacted not 
infrequen tly with u nseemly haste. Moreover , legi slat i ve ini tiat i ve has rested 
almos t entire l y with t h e executive.") 
59 I n Parl i ament ary systems , of course , Parl i ament does e l ect the Government . 
(Cynics h ave sugg ested t hat in most count r i es , parli ament might meet t o e l ect 
Government, then pack i ts bags not to re t urn for four years; see 
Schumpeter[? ] ) In Pres i dent i a l systems , most Parliaments did not enjoy even so 
muc h power. 
,. 
Cabinet set the law-making agenda. 60 Parliament approved whatever 
bill Cabinet presented . 61 That implied that the critical processes 
by which particular laws took their ultimate shape occurred within 
the hidden bureaucraci.es that translated government pol i cies into 
the finished bills that Cabinet forwarded to the Parliament 
lomng before the bills ever saw the light of the parliamentary day . 
As a second, anti-democratic consequence , in most countries, 
the law-making processes that occurred before bills went to the 
legislature typically granted elite and ruling-class v iews and 
interests a disproportionate influence. In the British tradit i on, 
inherited by practically every formerly British colony or dependent 
territory, prior to submitting thei bills to cabinet, the civ il 
servants consulted 'interested parties' . 62 Almost everywhere, 
senior civil servants perceived themselves as part of the elite, 
with its other memmbers roaming the halls of power . 63 The parties 
60 In Sout h Africa, the Seni or State Cousel, a man with some forty years in 
the Government service , to l d us that in h i s recollection , Parl iame nt had enacted 
only two Private Members ' Bil l s . 
61 [Can we get some d ata on count ries that i n xx years , rejected a Government 
b i l l e i ther zero , or very l i ttle? Ta nzania ( I be l ieve) has rejkec t e d exact l y one 
government b i ll sicne I ndependence (a bi l l to raise Ministers ' salaries ! ) 
62 
Speaki ng 
Britai n" 
Robert B. Seidman ,"Law , Deve l opment a nd Legis l at i ve Drafting i n English-
Af rica , 11 1 9 J. MoD . AF . STUD . 133 (1981) ; A. Kean, "Drafting a Bi ll in 
5 HARV . J . LEG . 2 5 3 ( 19 6 8 ) 
63 See J oe l D .Aberbach , Robert D. Pu t n am and Bert A. Rockman (eds . ), 
Bureaucrats and Pol i tici a n s in Western Democracies (1 98 1 ) xx (CHECK ! ) ; P.C. LLOYD , THE 
NEW ELITES OF TROPICAL AFR I CA (1 966) ; J . Okumu , "The Socio - Pol i t i ca l Setting" , in G. 
HYDEN, R. JACKSON AND J . 0KUMU (EDS . ) , DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: THE KENYA EXPERI ENCE ( 19 6 6) 
they deemed 'interested' rarely included the poor and disinherited. 
A Zimbabwe case illuminates the results. At Independence in 
19 8 o, after long years of guerilla war, a populist government 
wrested power from the repressiv e, white minority regime. A newly-
appointed deputy secretary in the Ministry of Labor asked one of 
the authors to draft a bill to replace the old regime's harsh, 
anti-labor Industrial Relations Act. 64 Following established 
procedures, the deputy secretary sent the draft to the Permanent 
Secretary, then still a hangover from the old government . In turn , 
under the cover of the Official Secrets Act, he sent it to 
'interested parties' The Anglo-American Corporation (then and 
still far and away the most important private economic actor in 
Zimbabwe), the Chamber of Commerce, and the Chamber of Zimbabwe 
Industry. Notably, he did not send it to any trade union 
organization. Anglo-American's lawyers drafted a substitute bill, 
if anything ev en more restrictive and pro-employer than the old 
regime's Act . The Permanent Secretary presented to the Minister not 
the original bill , but Anglo-American's version . Extraordi narily , 65 
the Minister -- no lawyer -- then brought the bill out from behind 
at 25 . 
64 From 1980 to the end of 1983 the authors taught and 
conducted research at the University of Zimbabwe . 
65 In Zimbabwe, in mo st cases, draft bi ll s came i nto daylight only whe n 
submitted to Parl iame nt . 
the veil of government secrecy, proudly announcing it in the press 
as the new populist government's contribution to a democratic 
Zimbabwe. At that late date, expressing vigorous opposition, trade 
unions and academics managed to obtain a few small concessions . 
Nevertheless, when presented, Parliament, backbenchers included, 66 
dutifully voted 'Yes' 
A bill-making process monopolized by the executiv e, 
denigrating the legislature into a forum for airy-fairy debates and 
the applause of an automatic claque, while behind the sce nes those 
with power and privilege exercise undue influence : That constituted 
the reality of most third world law- making (to say nothing of the 
first world) No wonder that so third world laws responded to the 
claims and demands of the disinherited! 
B. WHY EXECUTIVE DOMINATION OF LAW-MAKING? 
Ex ecutive domination did not always reflect ministers' lust 
for power (of course, that helped) . It mainly existed for four 
institutional reasons: Party discipline; in some countries, the 
high proportion of ministers in parliament; in parliamentary (as 
opposed to presidential) systems, the consequences of a negative 
v ote on a government bill; and parliament's low level of e xpertise 
66 At a workshop for legislators i n 1982 , backbenchers f rankly explained to 
the authors that t hey could not speak or vote against a Cabinet bi l l without 
endangering the i r poli t ical careers. 
I 
and lack of staff competent to deal with legislation. 67 
First, political party discipline constrained legislative 
independence. Typically, party chiefs punished members of their 
parliamentary party fractions who voted in opposition to their 
expressed will. 68 The extent to which party discipline affects 
particular legislators primarily depends on the size and strength 
of their personal local political bases. If, as sometimes happens 
in the United States, a legislator has a constituency independent 
of the Party leadership, that legislator need not fear party 
reprisal. Never mind the high command; the legislator's seat 
67 I t also helped t hat const itution a l l anguage frequently granted the 
legis l ature legislative power in the vaguest o f terms. See, e.g ., Constitution , 
Zambia (1 973) ( " 69. The Legislative Power o f the Republic shal l vest in the 
Parliament of Zambia which shall consist of the President and the National 
Assembly.") ; Const itution , Swaziland (1968) ( " [Art.] 62 (1 ) Subject to the 
provisions of this Constitution, the King and Parliament may make laws for the 
peace , good order and government of Swaz i land " ); Interim Const i tution , South Afr i c a 
(1993) ( "The l egi sal a t ive power o f the Republic shall, subject to thi s 
Consti t ut i on , ves t in Parliament, whch shall have the power to make laws for the 
Republic in accordance with this Con s titution.) " With such vague language, a 
cabinet can easi ly snatch the reality of legislative power from the parliament , 
l eaving it only a f o rmal isti c shell. The Cuban Const itution (1 976) expressed itself 
in language that took into account the realities o f diminished legislat i ve power: 
"Artic l e 73. The Nat i o nal Assembly of People ' s Power is v e sted with the 
following powers: 
* * * * 
b) approving , modifying and annull i ng laws after consult ing with the 
people when it is cons i udered necessary in view of the natu re o f the 
law in questions; 
6B 
* * * * 
d) annulling in t otal or in part the decree-laws i ssu ed b y the Council 
of State . " 
See n. __ supra. 
remains sol id. 69 
In most countries, however, party chieftains held the reins of 
power. 10 Many countries followed the British system in which the 
party central committee nominates the candidates . 71 An MP who voted 
against the Party likely found him- or herself a non-candidate. 
Even where the constituencies nominate the candidates, the Party 
chiefs holds most of the cards: Patronage, budgetary favors, 
office assignmentys, committee posts, ministerial positions, plain 
pork both for the elected representatives and their 
constituencies. 72 
Second, in surprisingly many countries, cabinet rules 
69 The independent political power of many legislators in the Unied States 
(exemplified by its unique system of primary elections for party nomination) 
probably best explains US exceptionalism from executive domination of the law-making 
process. [Any evidence out there? Try browsing throughstandard US political 
science texts on the Congress. I have rfead articles asserting that even in the US 
the executive dominates l aw-making; remember the years of Nixon's 'imperial 
presidency'?]] 
70 [Cite?] 
71 [Cite?] 
72 That party discipline fosters executive legislative monopoly embodies a 
paradox inherent in the democratic ideal of parliamentary sovereignty. A central 
premise of democracy posits that elections concern matters of principle , presumably 
expressed in the party platform , which the newly-elected legislature and government 
pledge to enact and enforce . That premise assumes party discipline and 
responsibility: Voters cast their ballots, not for individuals, but for party 
policies. Hence the paradox: Party discipline wars with democracy by making 
legislative supremacy improbable; party undiscipline wars with democracy by making 
elections all but meaningless. Because of the independent constitutencies of the 
members of Congress , the Executive does not invariably dominate the United States 
Congress ; on the other hand, because some of the Party's delegation in the Congress 
vote against it, a program of the majority Party does not invariably win. To 
resolve that paradox calls for more than electoral contestation. See, e.g. , xx. 
parliament because members of the government -- ministers, vice-
ministers, deputy ministers, ministers of state and so on 
comprise a very large proportion of the Parliamentary majority . 73 
In Belize the Assembly has 24 Members. 74 In 1995, of the ruling 
party's majority of 14 in the Assembly, 11 held cabinet posts. In 
1966, in Kenya, 59 Ministers and Assistant Ministers comprised 39% 
of the representativfes in Kenya's lower house. 75 In 1964, 37 out 
of 98 members of Tanzania's National Assembly held ministerial 
posts, 10, as Regional Commissioners, 3, as Area Commissioners, and 
one as Deputy Speaker. 76 In pre-coup Nigeria, government gave 
cabinet posts to some 88 MPs 77 ; of course, they always voted for 
cabinet bills. 
Third, in most parliamentary systems, a vote against a 
government bill amounts to a vote of no confidence, requiring 
73 Stultz, supra n. xx at 490 (In the middle of 1966, 5 9 ministers and 
assistant ministers constituted 39% of trhe representatives in Kenya's lower house); 
WILLIAM TORDOFF , GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN TANZANIA (1967) (in 1964, 37 out of 98 me mbers 
of Tanzania's National Assembly held office as Ministers or Parliamentary 
Secretaries; and additional ten, as Regional Commissioners, three as Area 
Commissioners, and one as Deputy Speaker.) 
74 Constitution , Belize .... 
75 Stults, supra n. xx , at 490. 
7 6 WILLIAM TOPRDHOFF, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN TANZANIA ( 19 6 7) XX. 
77 cite??? 
government to resign, and hold a new election. 70 By voting against 
a government bill, MPs put their own seats at risk. Only a very 
rare third-world legislator found any bill so distasteful as to 
require political self-immolation. 
Finally, the executive always had some in-house expertise for 
preparing legislation (usually in the civil service) 79 In 
contrast, parliamentarians usually had little, more often, none. 00 
Without special training, lawyers have little expertise in 
assessing, let alone drafting bills. Ordinarily, as a result, 
third world legislatures had no way to initiate legislation. 01 
Party discipline, legislatures swamped in a sea of ministers, 
the consequences to MPs of defeating a government bill, and an all 
78 Examples? 
79 In South Africa, in 1995, the State Attorney's chambers in the Ministry 
of Justice housed some 30 lawyers . In Laos, the Ministry of Justi ce 's central 
drafting division had six lawyers. In Mozambique, the equivalent had some xx 
lawyers. In Zimbabwe, in 1980-83, the Solicitor General's Chambers had some eight 
trained drafters. By contrast, China's Bureau of Legtislative Affairs had some 265 
employees, more than half professional staff. That evemn these staffs tended to be 
inadequate, see below, text at n. xx. 
BO For example, 
technical drafting staff. 
in 1996 the National Assembly o f South Africa had no 
It had one lawyer assigned to it, but he f ocuss ed his 
attention on problems of internal Parliamentary governance, and had no capacity to 
draft bills for MPs. The legislature of the Lao P.D .R. had one lawyer assigned to 
it; in Mozambique, none. In 1980 -83, Zimbabwe's Office of Parliamentary Counsel had 
one lawyer and no supporting staff. By contrast, in China, the Standing Committee 
of the Nati onal People's Congress had a substantial legislative drafting of fice that 
produced about 20% of the bills presented to the National Assembly in an year. In 
the United States, legislative committees had ample staff; so did individual 
coingressmen and senators; and the Congressional Drafting Office had a high degree 
of com [petence. See [any text on the staff 'on the hill']. 
Bl Stultz, supra n. xx at 489 
but total absence of staff: No matter how democratically elected 
the legislatoirs, in most law-making systems certainly in 
parliamentary systems -- these institutional features assured the 
ruling party and government an automatic legislative majority, and 
de facto e x ecutive subversion of the legislature's de jure law-
making primacy. Once parliament elected gov ernment (or at least 
ratified the earlier selection of government by the majority party 
or a party coalition), its members might as well pack their bags 
and go home to wait for the next election. 82 
Law-making inv olves two intertwined and interdependent tasks: 
Formulating appropriate policies, and incorporating the details 
required to implement those policies in legislation (and the devil 
really does lie in the details . ) 83 Effective democracy demands both 
that the pre-l;egislative processes which determine a bill's 
details become transparent, accountable and participatory, and 
that, before enacting, rejecting or amending it, elected 
representatives engage in transparent, active, and critical 
consideration of it and its details. In most countries' practice, 
however, the critical law-making processes take place, not in the 
legislative hurly-bur ly, but in the secret and silent bill-cr eating 
82 Schumpeter, supra n. xx , once sa i d the same about the United States . . 
B3 See [Robert B. Seidman, lawmaking as interface between policy and 
implementation] 
activities of faceless bureaucrats. 
' 
C. WHOSE AND WHAT BEHAVIOR CONSTITUTES THE DIFFICULTY? 
That in practice parliament typically enacts every bill that 
government presents to it makes critical the law-making processes 
that occur before the bill reaches the legislature. This section 
describes those processes and identifies their principal actors. 
As already shown,B4 for government to use state power to foster 
development, it must employ law to change the repetitive behavior 
patterns -- the institutions that perpetuate underdevelopment.Bs 
It therefore becomes essential to penetrate the mysteries of the 
process of creating the bills that determine the law's operative 
details. 
Every drafting system comprises many stages, each involving 
specific sets of actors whose behaviors determine the answers to 
six questions: ( 1) How do ideas or suggestions about new 
legislation enter the system -- and from whom? (2) How do these 
ideas get preliminarily explicated and by whom? ( 3) Who 
decides, and by what criteria and procedures, to to spend scarce 
drafting resources on some bills and not others? ( 4) What 
procedures ensure that the bill meets the formal standards, and 
B4 Supra, text at n. xx. 
BS Seidman & Seidman, supra n. xx, at xx. 
that i ts content does not contradict other laws? (5) Who does 
what kinds of research to determine the bills' details? Finally , 
(6 ) how do input and feedback institutions grant to some, and not 
other s, the options of supply ing information to those preparing 
bills -- about facts , various theories, and various groups' claims 
and demands? 86 Drawing on ex amples from quite different third 
world governments, 87 the rest of this section explores the processes 
by which drafting systems generally shape the answers to the first 
fi v e of these questions; Part III, below, includes an analy sis of 
the six th . 
1 . Origins. Everyplace, most bills originate in the public 
86 The way the bill-creat i ng system meets these c h a l lenges cannot be 
viewed in isolat i o n from the treat ment the l egislature accords a bil l after 
receiving it. If the legislature has a committee system which allows free access 
to persons i nterested in a b i l l , the f act that the pre-presentat i on institut i ons bar 
them access has a d i fferent t hru s t than where the l egislature has no working 
committee sys t em , and no i nst itu t ionalized method to enab l e interes t ed parties to 
make formal and compl ete presentations of the i r informat i on or claims. This article 
primari l y cons i ders the prob l em as it appears in the vast majori ty of countries , 
where in practice the Cab i net has usurped the l egislature ' s const i tutional 
l egislative power. 
87 Three fo r mer British co l onies , 
French co l ony , the Lao PDR; a former Dutch 
colony , Mozambique; South Afri ca; and China. 
knowl edge , little i n the l iterature explores 
Zimbabwe , Zambia and Beli ze ; a former 
colony , I ndonesia; a former Portuguese 
With the exception of Britain, to our 
t hese countries' bil l -drafting systems . 
The statements here rest on research condu cted by the a u thors at various times in 
these countries. See Robert B. Seidman, "Law, Development and 
Legislative Drafting in English-Speaking Indpendent Africa," 19 .J:...._ 
Mod . Af. Studies 133 (1981); Ann Seidman and Robert B . Seidman, 
"Building Post-Apartheid Rural Institutions : Transforming Rural 
Reconstruction and Development Policies into Law," in Daniel Wiener 
and Richard XX, YY (forthcoming) ; Ann Seidman and Robert B. 
Seidman, Lessons from China , Am. J. Comp. L. (spring, 1996) for 
Indonesia, the authors are indebted to Prof. Louis Aucoin . 
i -. 
service. Most make only incremental changes in existing law; in 
administering laws, public servants learn their rubs. Occasionally , 
bills spring from other sources: Political parties, non-government 
organizations, or individual constituents who ask legislators' 
assistance in solv ing social problems. The political leadership's 
adoption of a proposed new policy, howev er, constitutes the 
critical step. Almost invariably couched in generalities, 
political leaders, in proposing policies, rarely do more than 
identify difficulties , or state broad policy obj ecti ves BB ; only 
occasionally do the politicians even outline very general means for 
accomplishing the stated goals. Almost always, a policy proposal 
ends up on the desk of some public servant who tries to translate 
it into an implementable legislative program . 
2 . The concept paper. Wherever originated, the second phase 
of the process culminates either in a memorandum f r om public 
serv ants, describing the proposed program in some detail, o r a 
'layman's draft' bill .B 9 In Belize government officials call this 
a 'concept paper', an accurate phrase. The concept paper 
constitutes the nodal point at which policy turns, howev er 
BB Cf . Willia m H. Clune a n d R . E . Lindqui st , " What 'Imp l emen tat:ion ' Isn't : 
Toward a General Frame work of Implementat ion Research", [1981 ] Wrs. L. REV. 1044 , 
1060 (198 1 ) . 
B9 That is , any draft b ill not prepared by the central drafting o f fic e . See 
Kean , supra n. xx. 
r 
tentatively, into its operative, legal form. It constitutes the 
first cut at a legislative program. 
In principle, a concept paper's scope differs between 
countries with British rather than French legislative traditions. 
In practice, little difference exists. In principle, in the former 
all law has a binary thrust, one to its primary addressees, and 
one to the agencies charged with implementing it. 90 In that 
context, an adequate concept paper must not only formulate the 
substantive legislative program, but also propose methods and 
agencies to i mplement it . The legislation goes into effect at the 
time stated in the bill, or, if no time appears, at the time 
determined by the country's Interpretation Act. 91 
By contrast, in the French legislative tradition, the 
legislature enacts laws that consist mostly of 'principles'; the 
legislators do not consider implementation . The laws become 
operative only after the executive promulgates decrees that specify 
90 For example, t h e ru l e that commands the c i tizen no t to commit murder 
instructs the pol iceman to arres t someone whom he believes committed the crime , and 
a judge t o convict and sent e n ce. Hans Ke l sen called the l aw addressed to the 
princ i pa l addressee the ' secondary ' form o f t h e rul e , a nd that addressed to the 
i mplementing agemncy, it s 'pr inmary f orm '. HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 
(1 949) 61. Professor Hart essenti a l ly reversed t hose terms. H . L .A.HART, THE CONCEPT 
oF LAw (1961) 35 et seq. See Fig . 1, below. 
91 Usual ly , the Interpretation Act provides that a bill becomes operative o n 
the day of enactment, the day o f assen t by the execu tive , the day o f publication in 
the Gazette, or (as in Au stralia) , a f ixed time af t e r assent . G. C . THORNTON , LEGISLATIVE 
DRAFTING (2d ed. , 19 7 9) 155 - 1 58 . 
the means of implementation. 92 That makes easy what unfortunately 
too often happens in the British tradition: The drafters write 
bills without considering the question of implementation; that 
comes later. 93 
In both former French and British colonies, the concept paper 
or 'layman's draft' typically goes next to a specified government 
agency for prioritization. 
3. Prioritization. Everywhere, drafting services remain in 
short supply. 94 Unless some government institution prioritizes 
requests for legislation, too easily revisions of relatively 
unimportant, tedious laws will swamp available drafting capacity, 
while urgent laws looking to institutional change go on hold . 
Prioritization -- or the lack of it -- may constitute the principal 
form which in effect determines government's legislative programs . 95 
92 See text at n. xx. That in practice the U.S. federal system increasingly 
approaches the French, see Edward Rubin "Law and Legislation in the Admini strative 
State", 89 COL. L. REV. xx; Col in S. Diver, "The Optimal Precision iof 
Administrative Rules " 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983) (many federal laws have become 
increasingly 'intransitive' They contain mainly statements of principle, and, to 
give them meat, l odge power in an administrative agency to enact specific 
regulations. Those inc lude the terms of implementation.) 
93 Cf. the motor vehicle law in Belize; see text at n. xx. 
94 In Zambia during the 197 0s, before being drafted a bill without any 
special priority often had t o wait in the quieu for as many as five years. 
95 In recent years in many countries -- especially, those seeking to transit 
the gap between command and market-driven economies -- the development of an entire 
l egal system has become an urgent priority. Many of these countries -- China, the 
Lao P.D.R., Vietnam, for example -- entered that transition period with practically 
nothing by way of a formal legal order . In these countries, more often than not no 
law at all existed on subjects as fundamental as education, the national budget, 
I 
Some countries therefore lodge the prioritization decision mainly 
with political leaders . In those countries in the British 
tradition96 (and in the former German PDR97 ) , in a Cabinet Committee 
on Legislation, made up of members of Cabinet , decide which bills 
to promote. In the Lao PDR, in the early 1990s the Minister of 
Finance made those decisions; more recently, a committee under the 
Ministry of Justice, composed of the Minister and a small handful 
of e xperienced lawyers from Government or the National Assembly , 
undertook the task. Other governments seemingly regarded 
prioritization as a mere gatekeeping function, and assigned it to 
appointed officials : In China, to the Bureau of Legislative Affairs 
(ELA) of the State Council (the equivalent of cabinet) ; in 
Indonesia , to SEKNEG, the equivalent of China's ELA . 
4 . Drafting the bill. In e very country , once the relevant 
officials gav e the green light, the bill went tb final drafters : 
In the British tradition, to Parliamentary Counsel (in most of the 
corporation s, land law, t h e envi ronment , health, social securi t y, industrial 
relations . These countri es needed to d r aft a veritable bl i zzard o f bi ll s whose 
importance nobody quest i o n ed . In such a case, governmen t exercised its pol icy 
function not so mu c h by deciding what l aws it n eeded - - it needed a ll of these - -
but by prioritizing i ts needs. Frequently , however , t hose priori ties responded to 
conditionalities imposed by the Wor l d Bank or bilat era l aid agen c i es. (In the Lao 
P.D.R ., the World Bank conditioned a $17 , 000,000 tra nche on enactment o f a cheque 
law). Sometimes the resulting priori ties seemed curi ous. A USAID - funded project 
in I ndones i a drafted 1 5 priority l aws - - i nc l uding o n e on integrated circui ts. See 
the ELIPS se l f-eva l uat i on , 1 996 [get cite] 
96 Kean , supra n. xx, at xx. 
97 See below at n. XX, 
,· 
former colonies, in the person of the Solicitor General, in South 
Africa, to the Senior State Law Advisor) ; in China, to the BLA; in 
Lao PDR, to the same committee of officials that decided the bills' 
priority . 
In a principle grounded primarily i n myth , these final 
drafters performed only technical tasks : To ensure that the bill's 
language contained no ambiguities to cloud its message; that 
neither word nor substance contradicted government policy, the 
existing corpus of the law, or the constitution; and that the bill 
did not inv ade ' vested rights' . 98 In practice, bills frequently 
v iolated these technical requirements . For the most part, howev er, 
the causes of legislation's failure to foster development lay , not 
its form, but in its substance . 99 
In practice, of course, the final drafters could not a v oid 
engaging up to their necks in substantive decisions . Sometimes, 
the originat i ng ministry only stated the need for a law cov ering a 
particular area. In Belize, for example, a ministry requested a 
highway traffic act. The Solicitor General assumed the enti r e task 
of developing a legislative program and drafting the bill. In 
98 S ee texts on drafting -- espec i a lly the country regulations. 
99 Neva Se i dman Makgetla and Robert B. Se i dman, " Le g a l Drafting and the 
Defeat of Deve l opment Policy: The Experience of Angl ophinic Southern Afr i ca ," 5 J. 
L . AND RELIGION 42 1 (1987) . 
; 
reality, he simply copied foreign legislation that he thought 
appropriate (that explains why, although Belize has no weighing 
station, Parliament enacted a law with a provision stipulating the 
maximum weight of trucks on the highways 1 00 ) • Sometimes the 
drafting office in consultation with the originating ministry had 
little choice but to engage in substantive decision- making. 101 More 
often, their substantive interventions remained sheltered behind 
the myth that they simply tidied up the final drafts. The concept 
paper they received from the originating ministries frequently 
remained too broad. The central office drafters had to supply the 
details102 - - and in came the devil . In most systems, after the 
originating ministry approved their final draft, the bill went 
directly or via the Cabinet Committee on Legislation to the 
cabinet . 
1 00 Supra , t ext a t n. xx . 
n Lesotho. R.B . Seidman, 
Precisely the same phenomenon occuured 
State, Law and Development (1988) , xx. 
1 0 1 In Kenya, the total instructions to the official who 
drafted the anti-mini-skirt law told her to "Draft an anti-mini-
skirt law." Seidman, supra n XX at 44 [SLD]. In Zimbabwe, the 
relevant minister asked one of the authors to draft a land reform 
bill. When asked for more detailed instructions, the Minister 
responded, "You are the expert. You tell me!" The problem becomes 
compounded when the ministry uses foreign consultants as drafters. 
Typically, literally, the only instructions the consultant receiv es 
consists of the proposed bill's title: a cheque law, a mining law, 
a foreign investment law. 
1 02 The Senior Stat e Law Advi sor in Sou t h Afr i ca , based on his 4 0 y ears' . 
experi ence , s t a t ed i n so many words t hat wh il e drafting t h e State Attorneys had to 
make many substan t i ve dec i sions (authors ' intervi ew , J an . 1 994). 
( 5) Research. The civil servamnts in the originating 
ministry typically conducted the empirical research -- whatever its 
form1 03 which supposedly underpinned the bill. The central 
drafting office lawyers rarely if ever investigated anything but 
what they could find in a law library, primarily domestic and other 
countries' legislation. 104 
The kinds of bills that emerged from the bill-creating 
processes, in other words, resulted from the coordinated activities 
of civil servants in the originating ministries, the prioritizing 
authority (frequently but not always ministers) and the central 
drafting office. As shown above, in the third world, these actors 
seldom produced bills that even aimed at attaining development 
favoring the mass of the population, or, if an occasional bill did 
have good intentions, too frequently it remained merely a paper 
tiger that failed to induce its prescribed behaviors. 
Adequate solutions require measures that address the 
difficulties' causes. How to explain these officials' seemingly 
perverse behaviors? 
103 That might include 
relating to the problem, 
various social groups; see 
available documents, articles and books 
as well as inputs and feedbacks from 
the next section. 
104 Every third world drafting o ffi ce the authors have visited had in their 
libraries the statute books of many other countries, but literally never a volume 
anyplace on how those laws worked in practice. 
II 
EXPLANATIONS 
All the actors in the lengthy bill - making process behaved 
within a cage of laws and regulations that purported to prescribe 
their behavior: Constitutions, statutes, cabinet memoranda, and 
civil serv ice r egulations. Given this regulatory cage, why did 
those actors so often produce bills that did not improve the 
electoral majority's lot? This section first offers a general 
explanation as to why people behave as they do in the face of law ; 
and then uses that model to p r opose hypotheses as to the causes for 
the drafters' seeming inability to produce development-oriented 
laws that induced the prescribed behaviors. 
A. WHY ACTORS BEHAVE AS THEY DO IN THE FACE OF A RULE OF LAW 
Legislation can only serve to solve social problems by 
changing the behaviors that comprise them. Unless impleme nted in 
way s that alter or eliminate the problematic behaviors' causes, 
legislation purporting to transform institutions usually does no 
more than normatively describe the desired new behavior s, 105 as 
105 Eva von Benda-Bechmann (1989) , supra n . XX ( "The idea of legal 
engineering, of achieving soc i a l a nd economi c shape through government l aw, sti ll 
ranks f o r emost i n t he arsenal o f development techni ques. Law as a d esired s i tuation 
projected into the f uture i s u sed as a magic charm. The l aw - maker seeks to capture 
desired economic and social condit i ons, and the pract i ce supposed to lead towards 
them, in normative terms, and l eaves the rest to law-enf orcement , or expressed more 
generally ' to the impl ementation of pol icy . II) To the e x tent that most 
drafters hav e any legislative theory, its methodology tends to 
remain ends-means, see Rubin, supra n XX. Because that met hodology 
skips the crucial explanatory stages (see supra n XX), it too 
often as not backed by thounderous but largely ineffectual threats 
of criminal punishment . 106 Not surprisingly, laws of that kind 
rarely induced the behaviors prescribed . 
Competent legislation must rest on an understanding of why 
people behave as they do in the face of a rule of law . Confronted 
by a rule of law that calls for radically new behav ior (always the 
case with rules looking to development), actors decide how to 
behave deliberately . They choose . 107 In making those choices, they 
likely consider not only the law's promises and threats, but also 
all the constraints and resources imposed by their own particular 
circumstances . 100 Only if its drafters take into account all the 
factors, non-legal as well as legal, internal as well as e x ternal 
to the addressee, will legislation induce the behaviors i t 
prescribes . (A law that requires a notary public to v alidate a 
contractual obligation will go unenforced if the country has no 
easily lures drafters into writing bills that in effect mer ely 
denounce the social problems addressed . 
106 Kalman Ku l csar , Modernizat i on and Law (1 992) 255. As an ext reme exampl e , 
seeking t o i nduce Tanganyikan peasants to move from subs i stence to market 
agricul t u re, the Br i t i sh col oni a l overl ords enact ed an ordinance that required every 
farmer to grow at least two hectares of cash crops , under pain of a sh . 500 fine 
or s i x mon ths in prison. CITE!!!] 
107 This does not constitute a ' rational choice ' claim. Cf. Jensen and 
Meckling , "The Natu re of Man " , 7 J . APPL I ED CORP . FIN . 4 (1994) (man viewed as a 
rational , eva l uative maxi mizer, maximiz ing a basketful of values according to 
inbdi vidu a l priorit i es . ) 
108 Cf . FREDERIK BARTH, MODELS OF SOCIAL ORGAN I ZATION 
Insti tute Occasional Paper 23 [Gl asgow : Un i vers ity Pr ess ] 
(Royal Anth ropol ogical 
1 966) 
notaries. Manufacturers, faced by a law that forbids discharging 
toxic wastes into the groundwater, will likely evade it unless they 
know of alternative disposal techniques.) Figure 1 provides a 
model that purports to capture this analysis of the factors likely 
to influence people's choices as to how to behave in the face of a 
rule of law. 109 
----------- - --------------------------------------------------
Fig. 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------
----------------
Figure 1 illustrates that proposition: In the face of a rule 
of law, in choosing to behave as they do, the relevant social 
actors -- 'role occupants 111 0 -- not only consider the written rule 
but two additional sets of causal ractors: (a) their unique social, 
political, economic and physical environment (combined, these 
comprise their 'arena of choice'); and (b) the probable 
109 This model derives from the dictates of the American legal 
realist school of jurisprudence. They expressed the core of their 
teaching in the proposition that a systematic divergence exists 
between the law-in-the-books and the law-in-action, between rules 
and behaviors. See Llewellyn, "Some Realism About Realism." The 
sociological school reached much the same conclusion. See Erhlich, 
supra n. XX. 
11° Following the sociologi cal vocabulary , the mode l uses the term ' role 
occupant ' to denote the c l ass of persons whom a rule addresses. Role occupants may 
consist of every member of society ( "Thou shalt not commit murder"), a defined class 
of non-officials ( "No director of a corporat i on may use insider 
knowledge for private benefit"), or government o ffi cials ( "The Public Utilities 
Commi ss i o n shall prescribe f a i r a nd reasonable rul es f or the generation and 
distribu tion of electricity") . 
; 
sanctioning behavior of the implementing agency itself a 
function of the rule addressed to the agency and its arena of 
choice. That proposition implies that drafters cannot simply 
conduct library research as to the existing state of the law. They 
must make empirical investigations of causal factors in two arenas 
of choice: Those likely to affect the primary role occupant's 
behaviors and arena of choice; and those that influence of the 
implementing agency's behaviors. 111 
That drafters must make those investigations argues that, for 
two reasons, a bill must come accompanied, not by the usual flimsy 
memorandum that merely restates in layman's language the bill's 
obscure legalisms, but by a full report describing that research. 1 1 2 
111 As its principle category for investigation, the New 
Institutional Economics focusses on 'transaction costs.' See, e.g., 
Trachtman, supra n. XX. It adopts as ts model of human behavior 
the rational value-maximizer, see Jense and Merkeley, supra n. XX; 
Douglas North, supra n. XX. Like the meaning of 'value' in the 
rational choice model, see supra n. XX, the definition of 
'transaction cossts' seems either too narrow or too braod . It if 
means what Ronald Coase originally suggested, see Ronald Coase, 
"The problem of Social Cost", XX (1962) -- i.e. the actual costs of 
making a deal it seems too narro to comprehend all the 
difficulties of development; if it means what the New Institutional 
Economics school seems to mean -- i.e., anything that stands in the 
way of useful social cooperation, see 
that, as a guide to empirical research, 
many articles that discuss this XX] . 
XX, it too becoms so broad 
it becomes trivial. [cite 
112 See Robert B. Seidman, "Just ifying Legislation: A Pragmatic, 
Institut i o n a list Approach to the Memorandum of Law , Legislat ive Theory and Pract ical 
Reason ", 29 HARV . J. LEG. 1 (1992). 
First, except for the simplest bill, no Minister, Cabinet or MP can 
evaluate a bill on its face. (How, on its face alone, does one 
evaluate a bill concerning the reorganization of the Central Bank?) 
Without a report that provides facts as to the causes of relevant 
social actors' behaviors, how can responsible political authorities 
logically infer that the bills' proposed measures will likely alter 
or eliminate those causes? Second, the quality of a bill depends 
on the quality of the research on which it rests. An adequate 
research report provides a bill ' s principal quality control . By 
specifying the report's contents , the authorities can specify the 
research that drafters must accomplish. Thus they can make it 
more likely that drafters will ground their bills on reason 
informed by experience. 
Figure l's 'arena of choice', however, remains too large and 
ambiguous to guide the empirical research drafters must undertake. 
They need the more precise guidance which legislative theory may 
prov ide by unpacking the 'arena of choice' into sev en more narrow 
categories: The .Rules of law; the actors' Qpportunities and 
.Capacities to behave as they do (or otherwise) whethe r the 
authorities have .Communicated the rules to them; their own 
.I.nterest; 113 the £rocess by which they decide how to behav e; and 
113 If limited to c h o i ce a mong material i ncentives, that model of man 
confuses human nature in gener a l wi th the motivations of a s mall shopkeeper , cf . KARL 
their domain assumptions11 4 or Ideologies1? Each of these 
categories may serve to inspire hypotheses to explain the 
problematic behaviors at issue. 116 
The next two sections searches these categories of possible 
causal factors to formulate plausible hypotheses to explain two 
sets of behaviors that too often prevented bill-creating processes 
from producing effective transformati ve legislation: (1) When, 
MAR.x, xx CAPITAL xx (18xx) , and l acks empirical warrant: People seek to achieve many 
values besides material gain. If 'individual priorities ' , however, include non-
material incentives, then the model becomes non-falsifiable and trivial. See J ohn 
Adams, "The Emptiness of Peasant 'Rationbality' : 'Derationality' as an 
Alternative." 16 J. EEC. IssuEs 663, 663 - 67 (1982); Duncan Kennedy, " Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Entitlement Programs_ A Critique," 33 STANFORD 
L. REV. 387, 398-400; Thomas C. Heller, "The Importance of Normative Decision-Making: 
The Limitations of Legal Economics as a Basis for Liberal Jurisprudence," (1 976 ] 
Wrsc. L. REV. 385, 405 (1976); Richard B. Stewart, "The Development of Administrative 
and Quasi-Constutitional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decision-Making: 
Lessons from, the Clean Air Act, " 62 IowA L. REV. 713, 747. 
114 ALVIN GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY (1970) (the baggage of 
valuations and propositions all individuals carry around in their 
heads, part of their personalities, which purport to describe and 
explain the world the world) . 
115 Thi s category includes the actor's subject ive 'values and attitudes ' see 
n. XX supra , Thus it seeks to capture what some have called the 'embe ddedness' of 
economic decision-making. Cf. Mark Gronovetter, "Economic Action and Social 
Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness", 91 AM. J. Soc. 4 81 (1985). 
116 The first letters of these categories form the mnemonic ROCCIPI. These 
categories function to stimulate the researcher to generate hypotheses as to the 
factors likely to cause each set of role occupants ' behaviors; those hypotheses 
guide the research drafters must conduct required to attempt to falsify them. KARL 
POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (rev. ed. I 1968). In any particular case, of 
course, one or more of these categories may prove an empty box. For example, 
government officials usually know the law addressed to their positions. As a source 
of hypotheses to explain the behaviors of high government officials, therefore, the 
category "Communication" (of the law) usually does not i nspire any useful 
explanatory hypotheses . See generally, Seidman and Seidman, supra n. xx ; but see 
Robertson and Teitlebaum in Wisc. L. Rev. (even some judges remain 
ignorant of a new Massachusetts law giving judges the power to 
sentence to a drug rehability center in lieu of jail). 
infrequently, officials (here collected under the term 'drafters') 
actually formulated bills aimed at development favoring the mass, 
the resulting laws only rarely induced the behaviors prescribed; 
and (2) most officials seldom, if ever, even tried to draft the 
kinds of transformatory bills required for socially-beneficial 
development. 
B. WHY THE FAILURES TO PRODUCE WORKABLE BILLS? 117 
Figure 1 suggests that laws can induce social actors to behave 
as desired only if they alter the factors that caused the initially 
problematic behaviors. That so many laws did not induce the 
behaviors desired argues that the drafters did not conduct the 
research necessary to identify all those causal factors accurately. 
Why? Or (which says the same thing) , why did so few polities have 
in place effective procedures that required drafters to accompany 
their bills by an adequate research reports? 
a. Rules. Like all other role occupants, third world drafters 
117 The explanatory hypotheses here proposed derive from the 
research described in n. XX, supra . They appear generally 
substantiated by third world country evidence . As a basis for 
formulating appropriate drafting regulations for a particular 
country, of course, would require testing them against that 
evidence available as to that country's specific circumstances, 
and, in light of that evidence, developing and testing more time-
and-place specific hypotheses. 
too behaved in the context of a cage of rules. 118 The substance of 
those rules, their relative precision, the scope they left for 
discretion: All these affect and to that extent explain their 
behaviors. The regulations that defined the bill-making process 
had particular implications for the research the drafters 
undertook. 
Most governments specified the process by which an idea should 
become a bill in (typically unpublished) regulations (in the former 
British colonies, usually in a cabinet memorandum) . 119 Those 
regulations invariably did no more than prescribe the route a bill 
should travel before its submission by cabinet to parliament . 120 
Seldom if ever did they prescribe the sort of research required, or 
detail the structure of the. reports with wh ich drafters should 
accompany their bills. In effect, they typically left the kinds of 
118 In addition to all t h e ru l es specif i cally aimed a t the behaviors in 
question , thi s category includes a ll other related stat e-promulgated rules. For 
exampl e, to understand a farmer ' s behavior wi th respect t o irrigation law , one must 
look not onl y at the l aw l abelled ' irrigation l aw', bu t like l y a l so a t the laws 
l abel l ed 'wa t er l aw ' , 'property l aw ', ' contract l aw ' a nd , where the farmers whom a 
ditch services collectivel y cont rol its fl ow and a llocation , cf. ELEANOR OSTROM , THE 
GOVERNANCE OF THE COMMONS ( 1990) , t h e laws l abe l led ' u nincorporated associat i ons ' or 
' cooperat i ve societies ' - - and the i r related regu l a tio n s a nd subs i d i ary l egi slat i on. 
To understand d raft ers ' beh avi o r s, no d ou b t one ou ght to examine not onl y the 
draft i ng regulation s , but a l so the c i v il service regulation s and laws, a n d those 
concerni ng Cabinet and the l egislat ure. 
119 See, e.g. , xx 
120 [See pamphlet descr i b ing BLA. ] 
research to the drafters' discretion. As a result, the quality of 
accompanying memoranda varied with the drafters' own notions of 
what seemed appropriate. 121 Aside from an effort to choose 
e xperienced and able drafters, most authorities had no system for 
e x erting rigorous quality control over the bills they produced. 
If the rules permitted officials to decide what research, if 
any, to undertake , why so frequently did they neither conduct the 
sorts of research Il.Q.J: write the kinds of research reports necessry 
to ensure their bills' likely effective implementation? Where a 
law endows officials with uncabined discretion, the ROCCIPI agenda 
suggests they may exercise it not simply in accord with the public 
interest, but also with thei r own opportunities and capacities, 
their personal interests, the bureaucratic routines in which they 
function, and their domain assumptions. 
b. Opportunity and capacity. Few third wor ld civ il s erv ants 
had the capacity to conduct the social science research n e cessary 
to warrant hypotheses purporting to explain rol e occupants' 
behaviors . No mor e than in the first world did third worl d civ il 
servants or legislative drafters have any theory of legislation, 122 
12 1 That is the case with the Uni ted States Congress: With almost no 
prescript i ons detailing the cont ent of a Committee Report on a b ill, the quality and 
scope of the reports varies wi t h the particular committee staff person who writes 
it . See Seidman , ' Justifyi ng Legis l ation ", s upra n., xx, at xx . 
122 As Ch ief Tech n i cal Advisors f or a large UNDP-sponsored project in 
China , and a much smal l er one i n the Lao P . D . R ., whi l e searching for potential 
let alone one that required them examine the factors likely to 
influence social actors' behaviors . 123 Without a theory to guide 
research, the investigator becomes like a rat in a maze, butting 
its head at random against the walls. 
Even in the unusual case in which drafters understood the need 
for empirical investigations, they rarely possessed the skills to 
consultants to those projects in the past few years we have had occas i on to speak 
to over a hundred non - Chinese experts in various fields, mainly lawyers , and many 
with vast experience in consulting about legislation . Not one c l aimed t o have any 
theory to guide the bill-making process . Most theories that dea l with the 
legislative process focus on factors that influence legislators; decisions, not 
f hose likel t o cause the probl ematic behaviors of laws' addresses. See Annn Seidman 
and Robert B. Seidman, "The Present State of Legis l ative Theory and a Proposal for 
Remedying i ts Sad Condition, II [1995) J . LEGISLATION RESEARCH 219 (Seoul, Korea, 1995 ) 
123 If third world civi l servants had serched the literature to find relevant 
legislative theories, they would have d i scovered remarkably little. What theories 
existed fell into one or aother of two camps . One, based on interest group theory, 
taught that drafters should seek out the claims and demands o f different interest 
groups, see, e.g . , SUSAN L. BRODY, J ANE RUTHERFORD, LAUREL A. VIET ZEN AND JOHN C . DERNBACH, LEGAL 
DRAFTING (1 994), and urged that procedures produce a ' level p l aying fie l d'. Cf. 
Edward Rubin , xx, in ROBERT B. SEIDMAN AND ANN SEIDMAN, LESSONS FROM CHINA : A REPORT ON A 
PROGRAMME FOR DRAFTING LEGISLATION IN SUPPORT OF THE REFORMS AND OPEN POLICY (FORTHCOMING, 19 9 7) . 
The other followed the dicates of classical republicanism. In r epublican theory, 
"Legi s lators are motivated to so l ve those [social) problems [as ident if ied by the 
citizenry) out of a sense of civic duty. They do not make special deals for 
themselves or act solely t o ensure their reelection." Eric J. Gouvin, "Truth in 
Savings and the Failure of Legislative Methodology", 62 UNIV. OF CINCINNATI L. REV.1281, 
1344 (1994) . Most nee-republican writers, however , formulated no explicit theory 
for developing legislation, apparently relying on 'practical reason' -- commo n sense 
mixed with zeal for the public good. See C.A. Sunstein, "Beyond the Republi can 
Revival, " 97 Yal e L. Rev. 1539 (1985); C .A. Sunstein, "Interest Groups in American 
Law," 38 Stanford L. Rev. 29 (1985 ). A few authors in the spirit of American Legal 
Realism saw the importance of examining the non-legal constraint s and resources 
within which law operates. Before World War I, Ernst Freund " ... sought t o devise 
means to assure a higher level of professional competence in drafting statutes . He 
argued that the use of social science shoul d come as a predicate to enactment, 
insist ing that regulatory legislation should come at the end of an analytical 
process. " See Paul D. Carrington, "The Missionary Docese of Chicago, " 44 J . Le g. 
Ed. 467; ERNST FREUND, PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATIUON 19xx). Roscoe Pound spoke o f the use 
o f law as a t oo l for social engi neering. Roscoe Pound, That vision pretty 
much disappeared sometime between the wars. Recently, a f ew writers se ined the 
waters o f Law and Economics for a theory; the most promising followed the e merging 
tradition o f the New Institutional Economics. Trachtman , supra n. xx, at yy. 
undertake it . Most ministries had personnel who knew how to 
investigate all aspects of the resource allocation patterns 
relevant to their own ministry portfolio. For example, if policy-
makers desired legislation to reduce underground water pollution, 
the Ministry of Water Resources usually had hydrological engineers 
who could provide extensive data about the nature and scope of the 
pollution, the water flow, and so forth . 124 A law likely to end 
water pollution, however, could not simply command the water to 
stop being polluted; it had to change the behaviors of the 
polluters. The drafters needed more than information about the 
flows of poisons and water; the needed facts as to the causes of 
the polluters' behaviors. Yet only a rare Ministry of Water 
Resources had on staff social scientists competent to investigate 
those behavioral causes as a predicate for designing effective 
legislative measures to halt pollution. 
Only rarely did lawyers or other civil servants within the 
ministries ever have an opportunity to learn the skills to 
investigate the causes of problematic behaviors. Most third world 
civil servants have only completed their first degree, frequently 
124 The foreign consultant underground water law in the UNDP-
China project asserted that, on demand, the ministery's engineers 
could produce a report specifying the location and chemical content 
of every cubic meter of underground water in China. He probably 
exeggerated only slightly . 
. 
in a or humanities discipline like history or literature . 
Conventional educational traditions held that undergraduates should 
not engage in any research, but should mainly study substantive 
information; only graduate students 'knew enough' to undertake 
research. 125 As a result, most civil servants had almost never had 
an opportunity to study social science theories or research 
methods. Relatively few, if any, had acquired them later. 
Some of the civil servants who prepared the concept papers , 
and practically all the drafters who wrote bills their in final 
form, did have a legal education, mostly at the undergraduate 
level. In the English-speaking world at least, that education made 
no pretense of teaching the students social science theory, far 
less social science research methdologies. 126 No wonder that the 
research they did in preparing their bills generally focussed, not 
on real world causes of thir bills' addressees' misbehav iors, but 
what might be dredged up in the law library! 
c. Interest. Few responsible civil serv ants had much 
125 We taught for 11 year s i n u n iversities in f ormer British Af rican co l oni es 
where t hi s t raditio n f requently b l ock ed e ff orts to e n able undergradu ate s tudents to 
l earn-by-do ing through resear c h concerning t h e ir countries ' circumstances . In 
addition , i n o u r l egislat i ve p r o j ects work wi t h c i v il servants from several 
countries , o n ly rarely have we me t one with competent social science research 
skills. Wi th respect to China , see Ann Seidman and Robert B. Se i dman, supra n. xx 
[ ' Lessons '] ; see a l so ... . xx 
126 Wi t h resp ect to Chinese l a w schools ' see WILLIAM p. ALFORD AND FANG L IUFANG 
ASSISTED BY LU ZHI FANG , LEGAL TRAI NI NG AND EDUCATION IN THE 1 9 9 0 1 S: AN OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF 
CHINA ' S NEEDS (MS) (Worl d Bank , 1 994). 
interest in conducting the necessary social science research. 
Without a theory that called for that research, far less one to 
guide it, few saw no need to spend either their own time or their 
ministries' resources on extensive investigations of role 
occupants' circumstances. 
d . Ideology. Instead, implicitly if not explicitly , most 
third world drafters adopted an ideology that blinded them to the 
need to analyze the role occupants' arenas of choice . If they had 
any theory about the law-making process at all, it almost 
invariably f ollowedthe ends-means agenda in light of the pluralist 
dictum: Legislation results from bargaining between interest 
groups, a process which reflected not reason informed by 
e x perience, but power. 127 Whether formulated in terms of 
pluralism, 128 public choice , 129 or Marxism,130 interest group theory 
127 GEOFFREY BRENNAN, DEMOCRACY AND DECISION: THE PURE THEORY OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE AND THE 
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS (1993) 
128 Mark Kesse lman, "The State and Class Struggle : Trends in Marxi st 
Poli ti cal Science' II in BERTELL OLLMAN AND E. VERNOFF. THE LEFT ACADEMY ( 1982) 82' 8 5 ' 
reprinted in L OUIS J. CANTOR I AND ANDREW ZIEGLER' JR. ' EDS. ' COMPARATIVE POLITICS IN THE POST-
BEHAVIORAL ERA (1988) 112 (pluralism "minimized the importance of class, racial and 
sexual divisions. Furthermore , the l osers in the pluralist game had n o one but 
themselves to blame . Dahl observed , 'By their propensity f or political passivity the 
poor and uneducated disenfranchise themselves.'" At 85) . 
129 JAMES M. BUCHANAN AND GORDON TULLOCK , THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT : L OGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY ( 1 9 6 2) 
130 See Seidman & S e idman, supra n. , Ch. 5 . 
tells drafters that only power counts . 13 1 They need only to 
identify the relevant power vectors and discover a legislative 
compromise among them that reflected not empirical data as to 
factors likely to influence their behaviors, but their relativ e 
power . 1 32 
Sununary . The root cause of the bill-makers ' minuscule efforts 
to undertake empirical research before drafting bills or 
regulations lay rooted in their (usually unstated) legislative 
theory's inadequacy . Legislation can at most try to change the 
behaviors that comprise the social problems at which it aims . 
Unless a law addresses the causes of those behaviors, it will 
rarely do more than poultice symptoms . Uncovering the causes of 
behavior requires empirical research as to those causes. Absent a 
rule requiring a research report with a specified content, drafters 
13 1 Th e rules that governed the b ill -creat i on process in Britain and its 
former dependencies , for examp l e, did not r equire i ts ma n agers t o do any empirical 
research . I t d i d require t h em t o con sul t 'interested parties' , see Kean, s upra n. 
xx -- plai n l y a re fl ect i on of at leas t a n i nch oate i nterest-group theory. 
132 I n terest group t h eory resonates wi th philosophical posit i vism which 
insi sts t hat ' va l ues ' a nd 'fac t s ' occupy d i scon tinuous arenas; one cannot prove the 
Ought from t h e Is. Va l ues are i ncommensur ab l e; on e cannot be sure tha t a r i ch man 
who wants scarce milk for hi s p oodl e will not s uff e r more by i ts denial than will 
a mot her who want s scarce mi lk f or her rick e t s - a f flicted chi ld - - or even than wil l 
the chi ld (see PAUL SAMUELSON , ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (13th ed.' 1 989) xx) . 
The l a w always i nvol ves an ' ought' proposit i o n ; i t therefore always involves 
'values ' . Si nce reason i n f ormed by experi ence cannot he l p a l awmaker measure whi ch 
g roup ' s ' va l ues ' s h ou ld ou twe igh anot h e r' s , a d raft er cannot reso l ve a dispute 
about a b ill' s con t ent by r eason a nd fac t s. Powe r cont ro l s. The only research 
necessary becomes to d i scover inte r est groups ' c l a i ms and demands , and those groups ' 
r e l ative power (see _ __ ). 
remained free to do as much or as little research as they 
thought desirable. Without a theory to guide as well as require 
them to conduct social science research, and little capacity to 
undertake it, few drafters attempted to do any . Some (sometimes 
unconsciously) adopted interest group theory which persuaded them 
that a bill's content appropriate depended, not on facts, but 
power. 
For want of a conceptualization of how to conduct time-and-
place specific behavior research, bills too frequently flew wide of 
the mark. That proposition,hoever, addresses only half of the 
problem. An equally if not more pressing question remains: Why 
did so many seemingly populist governments rarely even attempt to 
draft nd enact transformatory bills likely to meet the majority of 
their citizens' minimal demands? 
C. THE FAILURE TO WRITE BILLS IN THE INTEREST OF THE MASS OF THE 
POPULATION 
Democratically-elected governments seldom proposed bills 
designed to implement institutional transformations to fulfil the 
majority's needs . To e xplain that phenomenon, this section first 
proposes a model of decision-making processes characteristic of 
complex organizations like government agencies; and second, based 
on that model, offers some explanatory hypotheses . 
1. A Model of Decision-making in a Complex Organization. 
Bill-creation always takes place within complex governmental 
decision-making processes of existing government institutions . Too 
frequently, people speak of a complex institution as though it 
consisted of a single rational actor1 33 (for example, 'The 
government drafted an incompetent bill.') That language misleads. 
In today's world, as shown above, 134 government decisions on bills 
come at the end of very complicated decision-making processes in 
which not one 'rational actor,' but many actors (some no doubt not 
perfectly rational) participate. In exploring the several ROCCIPI 
categories to generate hypotheses as to how and why those actors' 
behaviors combine to block formulation of transformational bills, 
'Process' frequently proves the most fecund. 
An input-output process model captures the main features of 
complex decision-making systems. 135 It demonstrates that 
133 GRAHAM ALLISON, E SSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAIN ING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS . (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1 971) . 
134 Supra , text at nn .s xx -yy . 
1 35 Seidman and Seidman, supra n . xx, Chapt . 7. The model evolved from o n e 
proposed by Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (1 961) . He argued that an existing decis i on 
found its proper expl anation in the input s and feedbacks that l ed to that decision. 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) s upra n. xx, crit i cized that mode l f or its failure to 
expl a in 'non-decis i ons ' -- i. e ., why some and not other issues entered the sys tem 
and came to decision. (That constitutes a principal problem this section seeks to 
explain: Why so few bills come before l egi s l atures that even purported to address 
deve l opment issues?) By emphasizing no t particular d ecisions, but process , the 
revised model here proposed s h ows why a complex organizat i on may produce 'non-
decisions ' - - in this case, development-oriented bills' exclusion from the the 
drafters' considerat i on . Cf . Allison, supra n. (sugges ting two a lternat i ve mode l s, 
of ' bureacratic politics' and 'process '; of t hese, his 'process' model comes very 
near to that urged here); Bachrach and Baratz (1963), supra n. XX, at 
655 (like decisions, non decisions occur "when the dominant values, 
[Fig. 2 about here] 
the range of decisions produced by a complex organization depends 
upon: (i) the input processes that determine whose and what facts 
and arguments the decision makers consider; (ii) the feedback 
processes that determine what the decision-makers learn about their 
decision output's impact; 136 and (iii) the conversion processes, 
that is, the way the decision-makers combine these inputs and 
feedbacks to produce their decisions (or outputs) . 1 37 
To change patterns of decisional outputs, legislation must 
restructure all three sets of process. These determine whose and 
what complaints and difficulties law-makers hear about, and whose 
and what facts and explanations and solution they will consider. 
To explain whose interests the system's decisional outputs favors 
requires investigating who has access to the input and feedback 
channels. Combined with the ROCCIPI agenda, the model helps to 
the accepted rules of the game, the existing power relations among 
groups and the instruments of force, singly or in cooperation, 
effectively prevent certain grievances from developing into 
fulfledge issues which call for decisions .... "). 
136 On different sorts o f feedback, see Karl Deutsch, "Socia l Mobil i ztion and 
Political Development ", 55 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 493 (1961). 
137 Seidman and Seidman, supra n. xx, Chapter 7. 
generate useful hypotheses as to why, in most countries, the bill-
creation system's outputs favored, not the majority as 
'democracy's contestation-centered definition predicts -- but those 
with power and privilege, 
2 . Explanations for the decisional output: Senior civil 
servants. 
If bills (the bill-creating system's outputs) systematically 
favor the rich and mighty, then Figure 2 suggests that the system 
somehow privileged their inputs and feedbacks. Looking at the 
decision-making behaviors of the senior civil servants who control 
the bill-creating system's input and feedback channels, this 
section proposes to explain their systematic tendency to favor the 
rich and mighty. Ostensibly, rules existed to govern the system. 
The ROCCIPI agenda helps to identify explanatory propositions, in 
the face of those rules, senior civil servants so often did Il.Q.t 
produce transformatory legislation. 
a . The rules. Two sets of rules usually determined to whom 
the drafters would likely attend -- otherwise put, determined who 
had access to the bill-making system's input and feedback channels, 
and thus the sets of facts and theories the civil servants 
cosidered: Those concerning official secrecy, and rules as to whom 
drafters should consult. In most countries, both granted the 
drafters very broad discretion as to whom they should open the 
system's input and feedback channels. 
( i) Officials Secrets Acts. In effect, in many if not most 
third world countries, Official Secrecy Acts ex cluded from the 
bill-making processes all except those whom the drafters chose to 
admit . Few governments' laws anywhere required public notice 
inviting all interested parties to comment on proposed bills . 138 
Even less often do they require drafters to hold public hearings 
about proposed legislation or regulations. 139 Instead , in many 
countries , on pain of draconian penalties, Official Secrets Acts on 
their face made it illegal for civil servants to reveal any thing to 
a lay person about a bill under consideration, or even the fact 
that it was under consideration. 14 0 In fact, however, the Acts 
138 
introduct i on of 
Swedi sh laws 
As an except i on, i n the Un i ted States the ru l es gove rning t he 
adminis t rat ive r egul at i on s make t his a c e n tra l requi rement (citeXX) 
go even fu rther in open i ng up al l government actions to pub l ic 
scrutiny ; see n . XX be l ow . 
1 39 As earlier me n t i o n ed , the drafting regul ation s i n the German Democ ratic 
Repub l ic p rovi ded t hat the origi nat i ng mini stry would s ugge st a sche dule o f inouts 
procedures to the Cabi net Commi ttee on Legi s l ation, which had the final decision. 
Supra , text at n.xx . 
140 See ROBERT B . SE IDMAN I THE STATE I LAW AND DEVELOPMENT ( 19 7 8) xx 
In Zi mbabwe , o n its f ace the Off i cia l Secret s Act carri ed a maximu m penal ty o f 
t wenty-f ive years i n prison f or reveal i ng to a person not authorised by law a f a ct 
that t h e defendan t h a d l earned in the course of o f fic i al emp l oyment . Literal ly 
read , that sub j ect ed a sweeper to twenty- five years i n prison f or telling a stranger 
t o the ministry how t o find the toi let . A Zimbabwean o ff ic i a l i n o n e minis t ry o nce 
took one of t h e authors t o task for reveal ing in a ll i nnocence to another mini ster 
that he was working on a parti cu l ar b ill . Bo th t h e mi nis t er o f the ministry for 
which he was dra f t i ng the b i l l and t h e minister with whom he d i scu ssed t h e bil l 
b e longed to t he same poli t i cal party , sat on the same Party execut i ve committee , and 
served in t h e same Cabinet. In Zambia, on grounds of official secrecy, 
a Treasury official refused to disclose to an MP, the chair of a 
parliamentary committee on price control, the basis for some 
typically granted civil servants great discretion to reveal 
government documents to those whom they decided to admit to the 
input process . 141 
(ii) Drafting Regulations. In almost all countries, the rules 
that controlled the drafting process1 42 also granted civil servants 
broad discretion to decide which 'interested parties' obtained 
access to their input and feedback channels. 143 Inevitably, like 
all public servants, they exercised that discretion on the basis of 
controlled prices. 
141 See , eg, pp. above. On one occasion in Zimbabwe, shortly after 
Independence, the Minister of Urban Development and Housing asked one of the authors 
to help draft some bills which he urgently wished to present to Cabinet . It took 
less than half an hour to drive from the University to the Minister's office . On 
arrival, the Minister apologized: In the interim, he had consulted with his 
Permanent Secretary (a holdover from the old regime) , who advised him that under the 
Official Secrets Act, unless a consultant had taken the civi l service oath, the 
consultant cold not see official documents. That , of course, made the drafting 
exercise impossible. (In fact, the Permanent Secretary plainly misinterpreted the 
Official Secrets Act, which permitted a 'person in authority' in his discretion to 
reveal otherwise protected information . The Minister, in his post only a few short 
and incredibly frantic months, apparently felt compelled to accept the Permanent 
Secretary ' s interpretation of the Act.) The proposed bill never did get drafted. 
The same civil servants, however, could and frequently did, discuss 
the bill with non-official 'interested parties.' 
142 In the British tradit i on, usually in the form of Cabinet Regulatons . 
1 43 See Kean, supra n . xx, at yy (Great Britain) . In China, bi l ls usually 
originate in a ministry. After preliminary drafting of the Chinese equivalent of 
the ' concept draft' , the bill goes to the State Counci l , which as of course sends 
it to BLA. Af t er redrafting a nd consultat i ons with the originating ministry, BLA 
sends it for comment to those to whom BLA in its discretion thinks should receive 
it: mostly government units, but not infrequently the trade union organizat i on, the 
women's organization, and the like; occasionally, BLA publishes the bill and invites 
public comments. BLA officials then redraft the bill in light of these comme nts. 
After obtai n ing the originating ministry ' s, BLA then sends the bill together with 
such of the comments from the public as ELA decides to include to the State Council 
for action (uthors' research). For German Democrat i c Republic, see above , text at 
n. xx. 
their own opportunities and capacities, ideologies and interests. 
Consider the Zimbabwe case: 144 There, as elsewh ere in 
Anglophonic Africa, and in South Africa 14 years later, the 
underlying compromise that led to the 1980 elections permitted 
blacks to contest elected offices, but guaranteed that the existing 
public servants (almost all white) could stay in office. 1 45 Black 
victory at the polls did nothing to change the bill-making system. 
For some years after Independence, the same civil servants who 
crafted the bills that enforced the former Rhodesian regime 1 s 
version of apartheid continued to draft most of t he new 
144 While in Zimbabwe (see n. xx above) the authors several seminars 
whose participants included the government's legislative drafters. I n many 
respects, Zimbabwe's bill-making system resembled that of South Africa's shaped by 
almost half a century of apartheid rule and still inplace after the 1994 elections 
(authors ' interviews with South Africa's State Law Advisors in the Ministry of 
Justice, August, 1994) . 
145 The Anglophonic, Independence constitutions accompli shed this mainly 
through the device of the independent civil service commission. In England, the 
'mother of parliaments' ensured that at least in constitutional principle, a senior 
civil servant held office at the pleasure of the Minister. That ensured that the 
official followed government policy. J. F . GARNER , ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1970) 34. The 
African Independence constitutions, in contrast, created independent civil service 
commissions. Not the minister, but these commisions had the power to discipline 
senior civil servants. See, e.g .' CONSTITUTION, ZIMBABWE, (1979) ART. 74 In most of 
the Independence constitutions, the requirements for appointment ensured that a 
senior former civil servant with l ong service chaired the commision. See id, sec . 
xx (Chair of Independent Civil Service Commission required to have xx years service 
as a senior civil servant) . Since the Co l onial Service had all but exclusively 
white faces, the Independence Constitutions ensured that in the new government's 
formative years, the Civil Service Commissions mainly served to protect the 
carryover, almost entirely white civil service from the new, e lected black 
politicians. See Seidman, supra n. xx [State, Law and Development) xx . Precisely 
the same sorts of provisions existed in South Africa's 1994-6 Interim Constitution. 
See INTERIM CONSTITUTION I SOUTH AFRICA, Arts. xx. 
government's bills . 146 They ex ercised much the same powers under 
much the same written and unwritten rules that determined who had 
access to their bill-making system's input and feedback 
processes. 147 The same laws imposing official secrecy, the same 
regulations controlling drafting remained in place . These granted 
to senor civil servants practically uncontrolled discretion to 
decide to whom to grant access to the system's input and feedback 
channels . 
Discretion implies choice, that is, the power to decide one 
way or another . 148 In American society, an individual has close to 
unlimited discretion to choose a spouse on any grounds he or she 
wishes . In contrast, the law grants public officials discretion to 
make decisions, not in light of private-viewing, but of public-
146 The same i ndividu a l s wh o had constituted Rhodesia ' s core of draf t e r s 
remained i n of f ice f or many years a f ter Zimbabwe ' s independen ce. Many of these 
draf ters had great technical ability; some, at least , patently sou ght as best they 
knew how t o serve 'the governme n t of t he day '. Equally patently , none had an real 
capacity t o deve l op trans f o rmatory l egi s l at i on wit h a high probabil ity of i nducing 
the desired new behaviors, l e t alon e change - ori ented l egi slat i on in f avor of the 
mass of t h e populat i o n. In Ind ependen t South Af r i ca, in Augus t, 1995 [4 ? check !] 
the Senior State Counse l ( t he chief l egislative draf ter), with had forty years of 
service t o the apartheid regi me , likewi se con t i nu ed to serve the new government 
whose principal election p l atfor m (the Recons t r u c t ion a nd Deve l opment progr a mme, or 
RDP) called f or mass i ve institutional chan ges . he admitted he did not know 
how to draft transformatory bills (author's interview, 1994) . 
147 At l east for the f i rst three years after Independ e n ce , the Zimbabwe 
Cabinet had made n o c h anges i n t h e Cabinet Me morandum that contro l led drafting 
procedures. No mo r e had t h e Sou th Afri can Cabinet, three years after t h e new l y 
e l ected government t ook office in 1994. 
148 See K. c . DAVIS ' DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY I NQU I RY ( 1 9 6 9) . 
viewing considerations. 149 Properly drafted laws therefore seek to 
limit official discretion in a variety of ways. 150 Unless 
otherwise specified, however, officials will decide, at best, on 
the basis of their personal notions of the public interest, at 
worst, on the basis of private-viewing considerations1 51 and 
nobody the whit wiser . 152 
In many if not most countries, the two sets of rules that 
directly affected the bill-creating process (the Official Secrets 
Act and the Cabinet Memorandum on Drafting) gave officials almost 
unlimited discretion to decide whom to consult. How they exercised 
their discretion reflected their particular capacities, interest 
and ideology . 
c . Opportunity and Capacity. That the civil servants worked 
behind official secrecy's thick cloak facilitated elite access to 
149 
150 Id. at xx. (An act may limit official discretion by stating the 
considerations properly taken into accoubnt, by requiring procedures that lkimnit 
discretion, by requiring that the authority adhere to precedent and publish its 
decisions, xx [complete ) . 
151 WILLIAM B . CHAMBLISS AND ROBERT B . SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER AND POWER ( 19 7 8 ) 
152 Cf . A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. , 
1959) xx; Robert B/. Seidman, "D raf ting for the Rule of Law: Maintaining Legality 
in Develloiping Countries, 11 12 YALE J . INT'L. L. 84 (198 7 ) (broad discretion a central 
exp l anation for arbitrary administrative decisions). It constitutes a principal 
explanation as well for o fficial corrupt ion. Robert 
B. Seidman, "Why do people Obety the Law? The Case of Corruption in Developing 
Countries, 11 5 BRIT. J. LAW AND Soc. 45 (1978); ROBERT KLITGAARD, CONTROLLING CORRUPTION (1988). 
the bill-making system's inputs and feedback processes. 1 53 In part, 
senior public servants' exercise of discretion in favor of the 
elite reflected their own opportunities and capacities : Senior 
civil servants swam in the same social waters as the powerful and 
privileged: they came from the same elite schools, they attended 
the same uni versities, they went to the same Embassy parties, they 
drank sundowners at the same (usually formerly colonial) clubs . 154 
Even if public servants wanted to consult the representatives 
of the poor , frequently they could not. At least from 1962 and the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the 1980 elections , for 
1 53 I n r es t ating Par et o ' s and Mosca ' s concept of elite , Bot tomore 
emphasizes this reality: 
11 [I]n every society there is, and must be, a minority 
which rules over the rest of society; this minority --
the 'political class' or 'gov erning elite', [is] composed 
of those who, occupy the posts of political command and , 
more vaguely, those who can directly influence political 
decisions . II T.B.BOTTOMORE, ELITES AND SOC IETY (1964 ) 
12 . 
That is, the concept of access - - i . e., of influence in political 
decisions -- constitutes an aspect of the definition of an elite. 
Everywhere, the working rules of the administration gav e 
businessmen and other elite members easy access to the civil 
serice, while excluding the mass. See CHARLES BETTELHEIM, I ND IA 
I NDEPENDENT ( 1971) 116; FERREL HEADY / PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE (1966) 69; A. L . ADU, THE CIVIL SERVI CE IN NEW AFRI CAN STATES 
(1965) 14. [NB this needs some more recent cites!xx) 
1 54 P . C . LLOYD, THE NEW ELITES OF T RO PI CAL A FRI CA ( 1 9 6 6) 3 8 ; ROBE RT B . SE IDMAN , T HE 
STATE, L AW AND DEVELOPMENT ( 1 9 7 8) Ch . 2 0 . 
example, Zi mbabwe faced insurrection; none of Zimbabwe's senior 
civil servants had any opportunity to communicate with the 
liberation forces . They had no experience 
or knowledge about ways to encourage black participation in the 
bill - making process. i 55 In contrast, they had no such difficulty in 
getting both formal and informal inputs and feedbacks from white, 
upper-class and elite individuals and organizations. Their 
interest conspired to welcome these ties. 
d . Interest . In countries where the rules directed senior 
civ il servants to select 'interested parties,' four sets of their 
personal interests frequently persuaded them to consult those with 
power and privilege. First, busy government officials alway s 
viewed their own time as a scarce resource. It made sense to spend 
that scarce resource on chiefs rather than followers . 156 A drafter 
155 Not all governments always lack t his capacity . Compare the bill-drafting 
systems in the former German Democratic Republicm, supra, text at n . xx , and the 
policy-making system in Maoist China , cf. J. Gardner , " Political Parti c ipatiuon and 
Chinese Communism " ' in G. PARRY (ED.) ' PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS (1 972 ) 218 ( II ... all 
correct l eadership is necessarily from the masses to the masses. This means: Take 
the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them 
(through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas); then go t o the 
masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them, as their 
own, hold fast to them and trans l ate them into action ... . And so on, over and over 
again, in an endless spiral, with the ideas becoming more correct, more vital and 
richer each time.") ; Michael Oksenberg, "Methods of Communication within the 
Chinese Bureaucracy", 57 China Quarterl y 1 (1974) (to determine prices for fish, 
fifteen higher- l eve l cadres stayed in a fishing v illage for a month, worked on 
fishing boats daily, talked constantly with villagers as well as their l eaders, and 
ate and boarded with common folk. 
report.) 
What they learned they summarized in their 
156 
a l ., eds. , 
See D.K.Leonard, "Communications and Decentralization", in G. Hyden at 
supra n. xx , at 93 ("the time available for communication is short, 
concerned with a mining law could always point to good reasons for 
consulting, not the miners at the pit face, but the mine's manager. 
Second, as reference group theory teaches, 157 civil servants - -
like other people -- tended to favor members of their own reference 
group, i.e., the group to which they believed they belong or 
aspired to join. Everywhere senior civil servants tended to 
perceive themselves as part of the elite. 1 58 In choosing interested 
parties to provide inputs and feedback to the bill-creating 
process, they favored members of their own reference group . 
Third, everywhere elite access did not come about only by 
operation of implacable social forces; the rich and powerful made 
special efforts to achieve it. Immediately after Independence in 
1980, for example, Zimbabwe Chamber of Commerce members privately 
and . .. choi ces must be made as to its allocation .... Among [the] group of influential 
units with which the administrator communicates, he may select a much smal l er group 
of the most influential individuals, with whom he seeks to establish personal and 
intimate contact. " ) 
157 ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THGEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1957) Ch. 9; HARRY M. JOHNSON, 
SOCIOLOGY; A SYSTEMATIC INTRODUCTION (1960) 39-46. 
158 J. Okumu, "The Socio-Political Setting", in G . HYDEN, R. JACKSON AND J. OKUMU 
(EDS.) ' DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: THE KENYA EXPERIENCE (1970) 25 (Kenya) i Lloyd, supra n. 
xx , at 11; Seidman, supra n xx [SLD] 402 et seq. ; see generally JOEL D. ABABACH, ROBERT 
D . PUTNAM AND BERT A, ROCKMAN (EDS . ) BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES ( 19 81) . 
In the British tradition, not the Minister but the senior civil servant has the 
title, "The Head of the Ministry". Typically, his office is as large as the 
Minister's, has equally luxurious furnishings and as much oak panelling, and i n many 
ministries sits directly across the hall from the Minister's office. At the end of 
a career in the civil service, senior civil servants in England almost always 
receive their baronetcy. The salaries of very senior civil servants matched their 
dignity. In South Africa, today, a Principal Director (the head of a mi nistry) 
received R.xxx; a minister received R. yy. 
and systematically wined and dined, in turn, each of the new 
government's individual ministers and permanent secretaries . 159 
Fourth, as elsewhere, bribery, both naked and disguised (for 
e x ample, campaign contributions), too often served to buy access. 
e. Ideology . Whatever the civil service morality of 'serv ing 
the government of the day' 160 , at least in the third world , few old-
line civil servants ideologically supported the new populist 
gov ernments . As in Zimbabwe in the '80s and South Africa today , 
civil servants' v alues and attitudes tended to cemented their 
interests, not to those of the mass of the population, but the 
elite . 1 6 1 Small wonder that they seldom initiated bills to 
transform institutions in favor of the mass! 
That the appointed mandarins of the civil service e x ercised 
their discretion in favor of the elite and not the mass hardly 
raises eyebrows. That elected officials whose position depended 
upon votes from the mass of the population too frequently did the 
same thing seems more surprising. 
3. Elected Officials. 
Why did newly elected, nominally populist officials so seldom 
1 59 Through a mi sunders t anding , a permanent secr e t ary of a ministry , a friend 
of ours, asked us t o come to one o f these as his guest. (The Chambe r o f Commerce 
hosts , obviously embarrassed , asked us to leave) . 
1 60 Garner , supra n . xx , at 34 . 
1 61 Supra , t ext at n . xx . 
propose transformational laws, or not insist that civil serv ants 
draft them? Why did the committees that prioritized drafting 
r e quests 
prioritize 
usually composed of cabinet members 
laws to implement transformational , 
incremental changes? 
so seldom 
not merely 
Some claim that official populism seldom constituted more than 
election-year rhetoric: Office-seekers cynically mouthed populist 
slogans only to win achieve high offices and their delicious 
fru i ts . 162 That explanation defies empirical falsification; 163 the 
only evidence for a proposition purporting to describe secret 
motivations comprises the act it seeks to explain . Pluralist 
theories hold that public officials have no agenda of their own; 
the State constitutes a mere neutral framework for interest group 
bargaining . Outcomes reflect interest group power , not officials' 
predelictions . 164 Public choice theories make officials themselv es 
an interest group, a set of pirhanas165 eternally snapping money and 
electoral support . 166 Review of the ROCCIPI agenda suggests three 
more v iable hypotheses. 
162 F RANZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF T HE E ARTH ( 19 63) . 
163 Popper , supra n . xx , a t yy. 
164 
1 65 Edcward Rubin .. . . 
166 
67 
a. Capacity. Few elected officials understood the imperatives 
for institutional transformation. Whether of the Left or Right 
when they first came to power, most conceptualized the independence 
revolution as self government and welfare payments to the poor. 1 6 7 
They had little capacity to develop a detailed legislative program 
likely to transform inheited institutions, far less to draft 
effectively implementable laws. 1 6 8 In the event, they remained 
captive to their civil servants . The civil servant's obsequious 
"Yes, Minister," concealed the power to do precisely the opposite 
of what the minister requested. These inverted the formally 
prescribed power relationships: Rather than ministers controlling 
civil servants, too often civil servants manipulated ministers. 169 
b. Interest and Ideology. Over time, too often rot set in . 
Once in office,populist ministers began governing through inherited 
authoritarian, class-drenched institutions. A fatal race ensued : 
167 Seidman and Se i dma n, s u p r a n. xx, at yy. 
168 In South Africa and i n Zimbabwe, f or examp l e , prior to Independence , no 
black l a wyer had ever wor ked as a d rafter; non e h ad ever draf ted a law. 
Seemingly, the new, populist governments there had little choice 
but to rely on entrenched officials to produce their bills. 
169 See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AGRARIAN SOCIALI SM (1950) i 0. ODINGA , NOT YET UHURU 
(1 967) 247 ("The Civi l Service, I found, could frust r a t e t he best plans of the best 
intentioned government . Given a c ha n ce, top civil ser vant s can d i rect a minmister , 
not the other way about . An i nexperi e n ced , naive, or u nconsc i entiou s min is t er can 
be commi t t ed t o a pol i cy i n f l at cont radi ct i on t o the overall policy of his 
govern ment . " ) 
Would the ministers transform the institutions, or vice versa? 170 
Transformation delayed, for two reasons self-interest too often 
motivated the ministers to join the elite establishment. First, 
crudely, some responded to corruption's corrosive seductions. 
Their decisions favored those wealthy enough to bribe -- inevitably 
excluding the mass of the population. 171 Less crudely but equally 
powerfully, as they rapidly acquired power and privilege, other 
elected officials responded to the status quo' s siren songs: 
Having won entry into the elite, why change the institutions that 
served them so well? 
Second, too soon, self interest transmuted itself into an 
ideology that rationalized at most incremental change. For many, 
probably most third world elected leaders, social change came to 
mean welfare payments to the poor. These rapidly exhausted their 
countries' reserves and then their credit; the IMF and the World 
Bank imposed conditionalities and SAPs; soon even the welfare 
payments disappeared . 172 Many third world leaders then embraced 
market-driven ideologies that justified the growing gap between 
170 Seidman and Seidman, supra n. xx, Chs. 8, 9 ; Robert B. Seidman, "The Fatal 
Race", xxx. 
171 Hochheimer on corruption (corruption part of the sociology of power.) 
172 Seidman and Seidman, supra n . xx , Ch. 1 0 . 
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poor and rich: continued poverty resulted from the implacable 
operation of faceless market forces, that governments changed at 
their peril. 
Recapitulation. For the most part, neither civil service 
rules nor practices facilitated inputs from the mass of society, 
but secretly opened the doors of inherited bill-creation processes 
to the elite. The civil servants' incapacity to produce 
transformatory bills, combined with the limited access of those 
interested in transformations, thwarted the drafting of bills 
likely to fundamentally alter the institutional legacy. 
Ministerial dependence on the civil service, and the rapid 
incorporation of newly-elected officials into old elites too soon 
emasculated ministerial ability and desire to implement 
transformatory legislation. That in the fatal race institutions so 
often coopted even elected officials further demonstrated the 
futility of hinging the definition of 'democracy' 
electoral contests. 
soley on 
In short, the negation of liberation promises resulted did not 
reflect mere personal failings of fallible and corrupt humans. 
Fallible and corrupt institutions made it almost inevitable. The 
solution did not lie in merely improving officials's quality; it 
lay in fundamntally restructuring the institutions through which 
they governed. Bills responding to mass interests seemed likely to 
emerge only if the bill-creation process itself underwent 
transformation. 
III 
SOLUTIONS 
To recapitulate the argument: Whether in a post-colonial, 
post-apartheid, or post-Communist state, attainment of democracy's 
promises requires laws that transform the old, authoritarian 
regime's institutional legacy. Yet the new, populist governments 
that had emerged by the end of the 'short twentieth century' 173 
singularly failed to transform those institutions. To do so 
required laws carefully crafted to induce the behavioral changes 
that composed institutional transformation. For that, competitive 
elections alone proved insufficient. In practically every 
'democratic' country, not the legislature but the executive still 
wielded legislative power. In practice, the executive branch 
typically shaped the bills the legislature enacted. There, the key 
actors included the political figures who prioritized the bills, 
and the civil servants who originated, elaborated and drafted them. 
The causes of their problematic behaviors lay not in perverse 
individual actors, but in the drafting institutions, that is, in --
(1) legislative draft i ng regulations that required neither 
empirical research nor justifications for bills grounded in 
reason informed by experience; 
173 ERI C HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES ( 19 94) . 
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(2) politicians' and civil servants' ignorance of how to use 
law to bring about the behavioral changes transformation 
required, an igorance reflected in legislative theories that 
emphasized interest groups' power, and inadequate social 
science research capaci ty necessary for investigating specific 
in-country circumstances; 
(3) a pervasive ideology that frequently opposed to populist 
measures; 
(4) the deep secrecy enshrined in the Official Secrets Acts 
that normally cloaked the bill-making processes; 
(5) the typical bill-making processes admission of inputs and 
feedback by those with power and privilege, ex cluding those 
of the poor majority; and 
(6) over time, the old regime's hierarchial, author itarian 
institutions' gradual cooptation of the once-new political 
governors. 
Of these causal factors, this article takes the cooptation of 
politicians not as a cause but as a condition . 174 The cooptation of 
politicians by authoritarian institutions over time seems likely to 
prov e less probable if the new governments rapidly implement 
effective legislation to transform those institutions to serve the 
people . Only if new governments change the old institutions 
before the old institutions change thei r leaders , can the people 
win the fatal race . 
174 That i s, t his art i c l e does no t purport to address a l l the causes of the 
developme n t of a bureaucrat ic bourgeosie, see Se i dman and Seidman, supra n . xx , Ch. 
9 ( t o cont rol the development of a bureaucratic bourgeos i e requ i res not only (i) 
electoral democracy and ( i i) transparency and accpoun tability in government, but 
also (i ii ) popu l ar par ticipation i n on- going governmental decisions , and (iv) a 
vigorous c i vil soc i ety.) This art i c l e focusses, i nstead , on ways of developing 
transparency, accountabil i ty and popular part i c i pation in only one cruc i al aspec t 
o f government , the b ill -creating process . 
Governments can transform the bill-creating institutions only 
by promulgat i ng and effectively implementing new rules to alter or 
eliminate the identified causes of civil servants' and ministers' 
problematic behaviors. Some of those causes seem easily 
eliminated. To replace the Official Secrets Act, for example, 
governments can immediately enact a Sunshine Law that expressly 
rejects secrecy and requires openness in the bill-creating 
process . 175 Recruiting new civil servants with the requisite skills 
and instituting in-service education to equip them with an adequate 
legislative theory and appropriate social science skills can help 
to eliminate ignorance about the uses of law to bring about 
behavioral change. 
Enacting a rule requiring drafters to accompany their bills 
with a research report structured by an adequate legislative theory 
could have two critically important consequences . 176 First, it 
would help to ensure that drafters conducted the empirical research 
necessary to demonstraate that their bills would likely prove 
effectively implementable and thus alter or eliminate factually 
175 The Swedi s h Constitution provided that c itizens should have free access 
to official documents, " subjec t only to such restrictions as are demanded out of 
consideration for the maintenance of privacy, security of person, decency and 
morality." Under that provi s i on , reporters have, on occasion, even examined the 
ministerial mail b e f ore the minister had opportun ityn to do so. E. Cam,bell, 
"Pub li c Access to Goivernment Documents ", 41 Australian L . J. 7 3 (1 967) . The 
Swedish government did not in con sequ ence t o tter. 
176 Ribert B. Seidman, supra n . xx, at yy . ["ust ify ing legislation"] 
., 
warranted causes of problematic behaviors. Second, it would 
assist legislators to use reason informed by experience to judge 
whether the proposed bills seemed likely to contribute to the 
desired institutional transformation. 
Above all, the formulation and implementation of laws likely 
to achieve essential institutional transformation requires new 
rules that ensure popular participation in providing inputs and 
feedback in the bill-making process. Only such rules will likely 
overcome the two interlinked causes that motivated many government 
officials' delay in pressing for essential transf ormatory 
legislation : ( 1) many if not most civil servants' authoritarian 
ideology; and (2) the institutionalized tendency for elected 
officials' interests and ideologies to merge with those that 
perpetuate the status quo. The one is the flip side of the other: 
As analysis of decision-making systems (Fig. 2) suggests, unless 
civil servants and politicians receive popular inputs, their 
legislative outcomes will favor, not the populist cause, but power 
and privilege . 17 7 
177 Our intuitive mode l holds that first a person has 'values', and then 
behaves in accordance with those values. Cognitive dissonance holds that the 
contrary also hpol;ds: That where a person must perform pasrticular activi ties, in 
time the actor come s to develop values that tell him that that behavior is right and 
proper. Cognitive dissonance wouhld hold that if the polity insists on popular 
participation in bill - creating, uin time civil servants will come to believe that 
popular paraticipation is right and proper. See L. Festinger, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE 
DISSONANCE (1 957) . 
7f 
Nor more than a country can copy another's rules to transform 
other institutions can it adopt them to facilitate participation i n 
its bill-mak ing processes . Nevertheless, other gov ernments' 
experience wi th efforts to open up that process may offer v aluable 
lessons. In the United States , for ex ample, 
legislators' independent political bases combine with the absence 
of party discipline to endow legislators with potentially effective 
legislative power . 178 House and Senate legislative committees 
hold hearings at which the public can provide inputs to legislative 
decision-making. In principle, members of Congress rely mainly on 
these and staff investigations to determine the facts concerning 
the unique circumstances in which bills must nestle . 179 In 
178 That part y discipline fos t ers executive l egi s l ative monopoly embodies a 
paradox i nherent i n t he democratic i deal o f parl iamentary soverei gnty . A central 
premise of democracy posits that e l ect i ons concern matters of principle , presumably 
expressed in the party p l a t form , wh ich the newly-el ect ed legis l ature a nd government 
p l edge to enac t and e n force . That premi se assumes p a rty 
discipline and respon sibili ty: Voters cast their ballots, not for individual s, but 
for party policies. Hence t h e paradox : Part y discip l i n e wars with democracy by 
making legis l a t ive supremacy improbable ; party u ndisc i p line wars with democracy by 
making elections al l bu t meaningl ess. In t h e United States , because of the members 
of Congress' relat ive l y i ndependent constitu tenc i es, the Execut ive does not 
invariably dominate the Congress; on the other hand, programs promised by the 
majority Party do not i nvariab l y win in t he Congress becau se some Party members, 
al t h o u gh presumabl y e l ected o n that platform , vote against i t . That paradox 
underscores the n eed for more t h an elector a l contestat i on. 
XXNOTE; IF THIS FOOTNOTE GOES HERE (AND i THINK IT SHOULD) THEN IT 
SHOULD BE ELIMINATED IN THE FIRST PART I (now at the end of the 
sentence "- both for the elected representatives and their 
constituencies." (about p. 27) where the footnote should read, "see 
note n. XX below . " 
179 Rub i n , s upra n. xx . 
pract i ce, however , in most instances the committees' staff and key 
congressional legislative aides have significantly structured the 
hearings by determining whom they invited to testify . Fur thermore, 
these hearings sometimes did precious little to develop facts . 180 
Instead, they merely became opportunities for supporters and 
opponents to register their support or opposition to p r oposed 
bills, while corrunittee members engaged in bargaining with affected 
interests . 181 All too often, the resulting bills refl e cted not 
reason informed by e xperience , but interest g r oups' relativ e 
powe r . 182 
The United States experience does not argue that legi slative 
180 Rubin , supra n. xx ; Gyuvin , supra n. xx . 
181 Ibid. ; Gouvin 
182 In the US as in the third worl d (see supra, pp. ) most l egislators and 
their staff seemed to adhere to one or anot her version or another of interest group 
theory (see Carnoy, 1984 : 9). From that theory, drafters might infer two principal 
injunctions: Their bi ll s shoul d ensure (1 ) formally 'fair ' procedures, and (2) 
respond to the c l aims and demands of all the stakeholders (Brody , 
Ruterford, Vietzen and Dernbach, 1994). Neverthe l ess, in the US as elsewhere, 
Schattschneider (1960:35; cf Mill, 1851) described the consequences bluntly: "the 
flaw in the plural ist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-
class accent. " I f all law comes from bargai ns domi nated by the powerful, those 
forces in effect hold the state captive (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963) . 
In fact, inter est group theory almost seems limited to a 
descripition of the problems posed by the US legislativ e sys tem. 
Impl i citly adopting an ends-means methodology , its adheren ts s e ldom 
seek to e xplain why , as long the legislative process me r ely 
provi des an oppor tunity for stakeholders to present their claims 
and demands, i t almost inev itably simply papers over inherent 
inequalities , rather than contributing to an increasingly effectiv e 
use of logic and facts, 
76 
hearings cannot create the conditions to ensure popular 
participation in the law-making process, but it does suggest that 
hearings alone do not suffice . Permitting public access to the 
input and feedback processes will likely only serve to improv e 
legislative output if the lawmakers adopt a legislative theory that 
guides them in substituting reason informed by experience for 
interest group pressures or the lawmakers' own 'values. ' 1 83 
On the federal level, the US Administrative Procedure Act at 
least required notice and opportunity for interested persons to 
comment on proposed administrativ e regulations . 1 84 These comments 
could provide information as well as interest groups' claims and 
demands . Apparently, administrative agencies generally did regard 
these comments as opportunities to learn about the facts from 
people intimately involved in the areas of concern . 185 
183 An appropriate legislative theory and methodology should 
serve to guide empirical research (see supra n. XX) . At committee 
herings on bills, legislators may conduct a kind of empirical 
research by asking questions concerning facts required to falsify 
alternative hypotheses. Without an appropriate theory , however, 
their quest i ons will at best reflect their intuitions as to how 
legislation may affect social change. As Keynes once remarked of 
economists (cite XX ), a legislator without an explicit legislaativ e 
theory remains in thrall to long dead political theorists -- a 
reality underscored by the Gouvin and Rubin studies (see n. XX 
supra) . 
184 APA . . .. State have state APAs. ASee, e . g ., .. . 
185 cite XX . This article's underly ing thesis suggests that 
the more consistently the rules explicitly required those agencies 
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i •t 
The former German Democratic Republic adopted another system 
that seemed to hold some promise for ensuring adequate 
stakeholders' and others' inputs. 186 A ministry must accompany 
every concept paper it sent to the Cabinet Committee on Legislation 
with a second paper describing the proposed drafting process: Who 
would serve on the drafting committee, what hearings they would 
hold, and where, and a recommended timetable. Since not every 
bill requires full popular participation, 1 87 these procedures 
provided a flexible device for shaping the participation processes 
to match the bill's subject-matter. The political leadership, 
represented by the Cabinet Committee on Legislation, retained 
responsiblity for the final decision about whom to consult. An 
investigation of how this system worked in practice might assist in 
assessing its potential advantages and disadvantges. Again, an 
important question remains: What explicit theory -- if any --
structured the rules as to the participants' presentation of facts 
to employ an adequate legislative theory to structure their 
analysis of the facts, the more likely they would focus their 
attention on evidence relevant to ensuring their regulations would 
really serve to overcome the causes of social problems. Research 
concerning the practice under these existing rules might offer a 
useful test of this proposition. 
186 Interviews with relevant officials, Berlin, 1984. 
187 A bill designed to regulate the safety provisions of high tension 
electrical lines probably need not have the same processes for public participation 
as a new law concerning health care. 
to ensure their relevance to overcoming problematic behaviors? 
Whether officials receive popular inputs and feedbacks depends 
in large part upon their understanding of the legislative process. 
If they adhere to a theory of legislation which holds that 
legislation merely responds to interest group pressures, then 
popular participation will likely become meaningless; the powerful 
and privileged can always mount greater pressures on government 
officials than can those less well-endowed. Only if the law-
makers adopt a legislative theory that directs drafters to rest 
their bills on reason informed by experience can popular 
participation become much more than an attempt by the mass of the 
population to lick up the few crumbs that fall from the table. A 
theory that finally rests on experience -- on data -- says that 
whoever has better data holds trumps. That constitutes the 
necessary (if not sufficient) condition for meaningful popular 
participation. 
CONCLUSION 
All over the third world, populist elected governments seemed 
to have failed miserably to carry out their promises to improve the 
majority's quality of life. Why? As a minimum, this seems to 
disprove the utility of a definition that identifies 'democracy' 
with competitive elections. Elections seem likely to help improve 
the majority's lot only if the elected representatives have real, 
not merely nominal power to make laws. In most countries, they do 
not; the executive has usurped the constitutional legislative 
power. To explain the frustration of populist dreams of people-
oriented development required examining the not the law-enacting, 
but also the bill- creating processes that too often take place 
behind a thick curtain of bureaucratic secrecy. 
The available evidence suggests three reasons why the bill-
creating processes generally failed to produce bills capable of 
transforming institutions in favor of the mass: (1) the civil 
service had insufficient capacity to draft transformatory bills and 
too often adopted anti-populist ideologies; (2) forced to rely on 
the civil service, existing elitist institutions too often co-opted 
elected officials; and (3) exclusion from the bill-creation 
processes frustrated those groups in civil society who sought to 
win change. To resolve those difficulties requires a legislative 
theory to guide civil servants and elected officials in formulating 
and assessing legislation on the basis of reason informed by 
experience, coupled with popular participation in the bill-creating 
process. Alone, neither will serve. An adequate legislative 
theory can at most ensure that the bills drafted will likely induce 
the behavioral changes needed to transform institutions. Only 
active mass participation in providing the relevant facts and logic 
in the context of an open, accuntable bill-making process will 
likely help to ensure that those institutional changes will benefit 
the mass. 
Democracy obviously does require competitive elections, but it 
requires more than that to ensure that government actually exercise 
state power on behalf of its popular constituencies. It requires 
processes that ensure popular inputs and feedbacks to government 
decision-making about bills, and a habit of mind of government that 
ensures that bills bottom themselves on reason informed by 
experience. 
